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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO  
A CUMULATIVE DISSERTATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a perfect world, all parties participating in economic activities would perform 
their duties as required and the issue of liability would not come into question at 
all. However, the reality is far from perfection and many parties often come 
across situations where an obligated person fails to perform duties at all, 
performs them only partially or does not perform the duties in due time. There-
fore, the question of liability in economic circulation is of central importance. In 
the case of a legal person, the possible liability of a member of its directing 
body comes into question in addition to the liability of that legal person. This 
dissertation covers the tort liability of the director of a company to the creditors 
of the company.  
By referring to ‘company’, the author refers to limited liability capital com-
panies, primarily private limited companies and public limited companies, 
which are the most common types of companies.1  
The director is the legal representative of a company (irrespective of whether 
his/her right of representation is based on sole or joint representation) who runs 
the company and organises its everyday economic activities.2 The director 
directly influences the profit or loss of the company with his/her management 
decisions, and the protection of investments made by third persons and perfor-
mance of concluded contracts directly or indirectly depends on the activities of 
the director.  
As a rule, the director is liable to the company only in an internal relation-
ship. If a person is elected as director, a legal relationship similar to the authori-
sation agreement is deemed to be established with the company. However, in 
the case of an external relationship, generally only the company is liable to the 
creditors and, as a rule, the creditors cannot file claims directly against the 
                                                     
1 In Estonian Commercial Code (Est. äriseadustik, hereinafter CC) (State Gazette (Riigi 
Teataja in Estonian) I, 1995, 26/28, 355) private limited companies have been regulated in 
sections 135–220 and public limited companies in sections 221–383. Most important 
Estonian legislation is available in English on https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/  
2 Section 34 of Estonian General Part of the Civil Code Act (Est. tsiviilseadustiku üldosa 
seadus, hereinafter GPCCA). State Gazette I 2002, 35, 216. Section 180 of the CC. 
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director. Nevertheless, in some exceptional cases, tort liability of the director to 
company’s creditors is possible.3  
The dissertation consists of the current compendium, which, in turn, is based 
on the author’s four publications:  
 
 “Limitation of Personal Tort Liability of a Member of the Management 
Board of a Company – Perspective of Estonia”.4 The article has two authors: 
Leonid Tolstov and Janno Lahe. Leonid Tolstov worked through the 
majority of source materials on which the article is based and composed the 
main part of the text. 
 “Personal Liability of a Director5 in the Insolvency of a Company”.6 
 “Personal Liability of a Director to Creditors in Case of Thin Capitalisation 
of a Company”.7 
 “The Company Director’s Liability for Untrue Statements”.8 The article has 
two authors: Leonid Tolstov and Janno Lahe. Leonid Tolstov worked 
through the majority of source materials on which the article is based, put in 
place the structure of the article and composed the main part of the text.  
 
The above articles deal with analysing the main situations in which creditors 
may have direct claims against the director for compensation for damage. 
Creditors’ claims against the director may arise when the director has 
breached any protection provision provided by law for the protection of 
creditors. One such provision stipulates director’s obligation to submit the 
bankruptcy petition of an insolvent company.9 An analysis of this issue has been 
given in the article “Limitation of Personal Tort Liability of a Member of the 
                                                     
3 In Estonia general tort liability is regulated in sections 1043–1055 of the Estonian Law of 
Obligations Act (Est. võlaõigusseadus, hereinafter LOA). State Gazette I 2001, 81, 487. 
4 European Business Law Review (Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2013) 243–259.  
5 The articles were written at different times and the author has in the meantime changed the 
terminology used in the English translations. Estonian juhatuse liige is translated in the 
English version of Estonian Commercial Code as ‘the member of the management board’ – 
this term has also been used in the translation of the first article written by the author. 
However, in English legal literature (not related to Estonia) mainly the term ‘director’ is 
used when referring to the position which corresponds to the position of the member of the 
management board. Since the term ‘director’ is more common to the readership of the 
articles, the author has decided to use that term throughout the following articles to assure 
better comprehensibility. Therefore, even though the first article and the following articles 
use different terms to refer to ‘director’, the object of research is still the liability of the same 
person.  
6 International Insolvency Law Review (Vol. 4, Issue 3, 2013) 268–284. 
7 Juridica International (Vol 21, 2014) 168–175. 
8 Baltic Journal of Law and Politics (Vol 7, Issue 1, 2014) 70–96. 
9 In Estonia, according to section 180 (51) of the CC the director of a limited liability 
company is obligated to promptly, but not later than within 20 days after the date on which 
the company became permanently insolvent, submit the bankruptcy petition to a court. 
Corresponding obligation of the director of a public limited company derives from section 
306 (31) of the CC.  
9 
Management Board of a Company – Perspective of Estonia”. A more thorough 
analysis has been presented in the article “Personal Liability of a Director in the 
Insolvency of a Company”.  
The author has also studied whether the director’s obligation to call for a 
general meeting in the case of thin capitalisation of the company, could also be 
a protection provision on which the director’s tort liability is based.10 This issue 
has been analysed in the article “Personal Liability of a Director to Creditors in 
Case of Thin Capitalisation of a Company”. 
Additionally, the author has analysed the liability of the director for 
disclosure of false information. Those issues have been covered in the article 
“The Company Director’s Liability for Untrue Statements”. 
                                                     
10 For the purposes of this dissertation, thin capitalisation is a situation when the net assets 
(total assets minus total obligations shown under liabilities on a balance sheet) of the 
company are less than the minimum amount provided by law. In Estonia the net assets may 
not fall below one-half of the registered share capital or below minimum amount of the share 
capital provided by law (section 171 (2) 1) of the CC for private limited companies; section 
292 (1) 1) of the CC for public limited companies). 
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2. POSING AND DEFINING  
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
2.1. Posing the Research Problem 
During the writing of this dissertation from 2011 to 2014, Europe has constantly 
been either in clear financial crisis or at least in danger of a crisis. Hence the 
topics concerning protection of creditors and encouragement of the spirit of 
entrepreneurship have been especially relevant. Quintessentially, these two 
topics are controversial – encouragement of the spirit of entrepreneurship presu-
mes, among other things, that entrepreneurs are induced to take larger business 
risks while larger business risks may often damage the interests of creditors to a 
greater extent. Therefore, it is important to consider with every solution the 
interest of creditors to maintain their financial investment on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, the interest of the director who is using that investment in the 
business activity to be protected from the attacks of creditors in case s(he) 
should economically fail.  
Pursuant to section 31 (5) of Estonian GPCCA, the activities of a body of a 
legal person (board of directors) are deemed to be the activities of the legal 
person. Hence the company can be held liable for the director’s activity as for 
its own breach.11 Thus, one drastic solution that could be offered is that the 
directors will never be held personally liable on tortious grounds and only the 
company will always bear liability. However, acting in someone else’s name 
does not exclude tort liability of the representative, which is why the other 
extreme would be to always hold the director liable for damage caused to a third 
person, irrespective of whether the company is held liable or not. Both solutions 
have their own risks – the first solution would indeed encourage the director to 
take business risks, but it might give rise to the temptation to abuse the com-
pany as a corporate shell; in the case of the second solution, however, the 
director would be exposed to a possible array of claims and that might make the 
director indecisive since (s)he will not have the nerve to take any business risks.  
Based on the above, the objective of this dissertation is to determine the 
reasonable boundaries of the director’s tort liability that, one the one hand, 
would protect the legitimate interests of creditors and, on the other hand, would 
limit the liability of the director in such a way that the director’s spirit of 
entrepreneurship would not be hindered. 
In order to achieve the objective of the work, the author will analyse the 
following research questions: 
 Is it grounded to simplify the burden of proof of old creditors upon enforce-
ment of quota loss claims against a director who has breachd the duty to file 
a bankruptcy petition? 
                                                     
11 Paul Varul, Irene Kull et al, Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus, Kommenteeritud väljaanne 
[General Part of the Civil Code Act, Commented Edition] (Tallinn, Juura 2010) 110–111. 
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 Should the protection purpose of the duty to file the bankruptcy petition also 
be the compensation for new creditors’ reliance loss in addition to the 
compensation for old creditors’ quota loss? 
 Is the director’s tort liability to creditors grounded when the director has 
failed to act in the situation of thin capitalisation of the company, and if so, 
then on what conditions? 
 Is the director’s tort liability to creditors grounded when the director has 
caused damage by intentionally disclosing untrue statements, and if so, then 
on what conditions? 
 Is the director’s direct liability to company’s creditors grounded for negli-
gent misrepresentation, and if so, then on what conditions? 
Posing the research questions the author has kept in mind primarily Estonian 
law. However, the statements set forth by the author are in principle universal 
and should be considered in all countries under comparison. 
 
 
2.2. Defining the Topic 
2.2.1. The Director of the Company as the Subject Obligated to 
Compensate for Damage 
The author has primarily analysed the liability of directors of private limited 
companies (in Estonian osaühing) and public limited companies (in Estonian 
aktsiaselts) as those are the most widespread forms of companies.12 Companies 
corresponding to private limited companies and public limited companies exist 
in all countries studied within the framework of this dissertation: Gesellschaft 
mit bergenzter Haftung (GmbH) and Aktiengesellschaft (AG) in Germany, 
Private Limited Company (Plc) and Public Limited Company (Ltd) in England 
and Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (Srl) and Sociedad Anónima (SA) in 
Spain. Liability of the director of the private limited company and the public 
limited company is quintessentially very similar; therefore, for better readabili-
ty, this dissertation mainly talks about the liability of the director of the private 
limited company while presuming that the liability of the director of the public 
limited company follows the same pattern. Other forms of associations have not 
been covered in the dissertation primarily due to their little practical meaning. 
Since other forms of associations are rare in practice, the number of litigations 
related to them is small. However, it must be noted that quintessentially there 
can only be subtle differences in tort liability of directors of other forms of 
associations.13  
                                                     
12 As at 1 January 2014, ca 93% of the 145,971 companies registered in Estonia were private 
limited companies. Private limited companies were followed by public limited companies by 
ca 2.6%. Statistics available at http://www2.rik.ee/rikstatfailid/failid/tabel.php?url= 
14_01tg.htm, (last accessed on 1.2.2014). 
13 There is, however, a fundamental difference in the liability of partners trusted to manage 
general partnerships and limited partnerships since, pursuant to section 101 (2) of the CC, 
12 
Pursuant to section 180 (1) of the CC, the board of directors is a directing 
body of the private limited company which represents and manages the private 
limited company.14 When a person is elected as director, exchange of an offer 
and acceptance takes place as a result of which a contract, irrespective of its 
form, is deemed to have been concluded between the company and the director. 
Out of the main types of contracts established by the LOA, it corresponds to the 
regulation of authorisation agreements (section 619 ff of the LOA) the most.15 
In the current dissertation, the author has only studied the liability of the de 
iure director. A person can be deemed to be a de iure director if his/her election 
as director is valid and s(he) has valid powers. However, acting in place or in 
parallel with the de iure director, there can also be a de facto director who does 
not have the powers of the director, but who, in legal transactions performs 
duties of the director.  
A person can prove to be a de facto director because s(he) has been negligent 
and has forgotten that his/her term of authority has expired.16 However, taking 
on the position of the de facto director may also be a conscious choice, 
especially if the de facto director acts secretly in the background (e.g., the 
company’s actual manager who has appointed his stay-at-home wife director).17 
As it have been pointed out in legal literature the main criterion on the basis of 
which a person can be deemed to be the de facto director is permanent and 
independent performance of the functions of the director.18 This usually takes 
place when the company does not have directors with valid authority, but 
someone is still performing the duties of the director in practice. Nevertheless, it 
is also possible to run a company de facto in parallel with the directors 
appointed to office if those directors are passive in their role or follow the 
orders of the de facto manager without intervention. However, activities of 
members of the supervisory board or shareholders who have control over the 
board of directors and who as the superior body give orders that the board of 
directors is obligated to follow cannot be considered as the activities of the de 
                                                                                                                                  
partners will be solidarily liable for the obligations of the general partnership and limited 
partnership with all their assets. 
14 Corresponding provision on the director of the public limited company is section 306 (1) 
of the CC. 
15 Judgements of the Supreme Court of Estonia of 8 October 2008 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-
65-08 and of 9 December 2008 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-103-08. Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Estonia are available at www.nc.ee (in Estonian). 
16 According to Estonian judicial practice, term of office of the director cannot be deemed 
renewed merely for the reason that the person continues to act as a director – judgement of 
the Supreme Court of 8 October 2008 in court case No. 3-2-1-65-08. 
17 Fernando Martínez Sanz, Los administradores responsables, in Àngel Rojo, Emilio 
Beltran, Ana Belén Campuzano (eds), La responsabilidad de los administradores de las 
sociedades mercantiles. 4th edn. (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch 2011) 64–65. 
18 Pablo Girgado Perandones, La responsabilidad de la sociedad matriz y de los admi-
nistradores en una empresa de grupo (Madrid, Barcelona, Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas 
y Sociales 2002) 183. 
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facto director.19 Provision of advisory services to the director or, for instance, 
the activity of a creditor towards the company cannot, as a rule, be deemed to be 
the activity of the de facto director either.20 
One consequence of acting as a de facto director in Estonia is that it may 
bring about non-contractual liability of the director to a legal person.21 To third 
persons, including creditors of the company, such a director may still be held 
liable on tortious grounds. However, it is important to keep in mind that if a 
person does not have the legal authority to act as a director in Estonia, s(he) 
cannot have the statutory duties of the director either. For example, from a 
formal legal point of view a person who is not a de iure director can neither call 
the general meeting of shareholders should it prove necessary to do so to 
resolve issues related to negative shareholders’ equity, nor file the debtor’s 
bankruptcy petition when the company has become permanently insolvent. 
There is no reason to claim that a person who is not a de jure director would 
have the obligation to observe a protection provision arising from law.22 
Therefore, it can be said that, as a rule, the de facto director cannot be held 
liable in Estonia to third persons on tortious grounds if the potential liability is 
based on the person’s inactivity. For the person to be held liable for damage 
caused by inactivity, a corresponding protection provision or general duty to 
maintain safety must arise from law. In the absence of such protection provision 
or duty to maintain safety, unlawfulness of inactivity, which is a necessary 
precondition of tort liability, ceases to exist. As an exception, tort liability of a 
director who is acting de facto can be affirmed if his/her inactivity could be 
treated also as causing intentional damage that is contrary to good morals.  
In addition to the director, there are other persons who could be in a position 
similar to the position of the director, such as the liquidator, procurator and 
trustee in bankruptcy.23 In the case of disclosure of untrue statements, the 
                                                     
19 Fernando Sánchez Calero, Ricardo Alonso García et al, Los administradores en las 
sociedades de capital. 2nd edn. First published 2005 (Thomson 2007) 316. 
20 Derek French, Stephen W. Mayson, Christopher L. Ryan, Company Law. 26th edn. First 
published 1982 (Oxford University Press 2009) 429–430. 
21 In its judgement of 11 June 2008 in court case No. 3-2-1-44-08 the Supreme Court has 
found that since the defendant was no longer director of the plaintiff starting from 23 
December 2003 and the defendant found out about his removal from the board of directors 
on that same day, he may be held liable on non-contractual grounds for the damage caused to 
the plaintiff by transferring 500,000 kroons over to the employer.  
22 In exceptional circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that if the de facto director knowingly 
takes advantage of the situation and fails to file the bankruptcy petition, his/her activities can 
be considered as being contrary to good morals (but not as the breach of a protection 
provision). See on this: Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland Rixecker, Gerhard Wagner et al, 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil III. Vol. 5. (München, C.H. Beck 
2009) 1925. 
23 Pursuant to section 209 (1) of the CC, liquidators have the rights and obligations of the 
board of directors which are not contrary to the nature of liquidation. Pursuant to section 16 
(1) of the CC, procuration is an authorisation which grants the procurator the right to 
represent the undertaking in concluding all transactions related to economic activities. 
Pursuant to section 541 (3) of Estonian Bankruptcy Act (Est. pankrotiseadus, hereinafter BA, 
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question of tort liability may arise concerning those persons similarly to the 
liability of the director. Nevertheless, liability for failure to file the bankruptcy 
petition cannot become an issue with regard to the procurator and trustee in 
bankruptcy. It is doubtful whether the question of liability in the case of thin 
capitalisation of a company could become an issue with regard to the 
liquidator.24  
Pursuant to section 31 (2) of the CPCCA, the board of directors and the 
supervisory board are the directing bodies of a company. The competence of the 
supervisory board significantly differs from that of the director. Unlike the 
board of directors, the supervisory board neither has the right to independently 
represent the company nor does it manage the company’s everyday activities. 
For that reason, as a rule, the issues referred to in the research questions cannot 
arise with respect to the supervisory board.25  
In the current dissertation, the author has studied the liability of the de iure 
director of the company. Analysis of the liability of the de facto director, 
liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, procurator and member of the supervisory 
board remains outside the scope of this dissertation. 
 
 
2.2.2. Civil Liability of the Director 
The liability of the director is a broad topic that is connected to different fields 
of law, such as company law, law of obligations (contract and tort law), 
criminal law and tax law. Therefore, full coverage of all aspects of the liability 
of the director within a single dissertation is not possible and due to that, the 
author has limited his research to tort liability of the director of the company to 
creditors. In order to define the topic, the author will give a brief overview of 
civil liability of the director as follows. 
What is meant by civil liability of the director is the obligation of the 
director to compensate for damage. Obligation to compensate for damage may 
arise from breach of the duties of the director either in an internal or external 
relationship. 
                                                                                                                                  
State Gazette I, 2003, 17, 95), the trustee in bankruptcy may enter into all transactions and 
perform all legal acts with the bankruptcy estate of a debtor who is a legal person.  
24 The work of the liquidator is aimed at liquidating the company, including distributing the 
assets among the shareholders (section 216 (1) of the CC). Therefore, it could be said that 
the task of the liquidator is to induce the company’s thin capitalisation which will result in 
deletion of the company from the Commercial Register (section 218 (1) of the CC). 
25 Pursuant to law, the supervisory board does not have the obligation to file the bankruptcy 
petition; the supervisory board does not have any direct obligations in the case of thin 
capitalisation of the company either. In theory, a member of the supervisory board could be 
held liable for disclosure of untrue statements; however, since the supervisory board does 
not have the right to represent the company it cannot, as a rule, happen in practice that, for 
example, the member of the supervisory board enters into a transaction in the name of the 
company (it can become an issue if a separate authorisation document has been issued to the 
member of the supervisory board; however, in that case s(he) will not be performing the 
usual functions of the supervisory board anymore). 
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General duties that are based on the director’s internal relationship derive 
from section 35 of the GPCCA pursuant to which, the members of a directing 
body of a legal person must perform their obligations arising from law or the 
articles of association with the diligence normally expected from a member of a 
directing body and must be loyal to the legal person. Same obligations have 
been listed in the regulation concerning authorisation agreements (section 620 
of the LOA). 
As noted above, internal relationship between the director and the company 
is based on (authorisation) agreement and, therefore, the liability of the director 
can, first and foremost, be contractual as well. Section 35 of the GPCCA and 
section 620 of the LOA define the general contractual duties of the director, the 
breach of which may bring about liability based on the director’s internal 
relationship. Since general duties of the director only apply to the company to 
which s(he) is the director, third persons cannot refer to the director’s breach of 
the duty to act diligently with respect to creditors. This is, among other things, 
supported by section 31 (5) of the GPCCA pursuant to which, the activities of a 
body of a legal person are deemed to be the activities of the legal person. 
Consequently, the director can, as a rule, only be held liable to the company on 
contractual grounds and with respect to third persons, activities of the director 
are deemed to be the activities of the company. 
Pursuant to section 37 (2) of the GPCCA, the creditor can indeed file an 
action against the director; however, in that case the object of claim will be 
damage caused to the company (not to the creditor) and compensation for that 
damage can be ordered for the benefit of the company and not the creditor.26 
From the perspective of substantive law, this claim is no different from the 
company’s contractual claim against the director. The difference is mainly 
procedural, enabling the creditor to file the compensatory claim instead of the 
company if, for any reason, the company should refuse to file the claim or delay 
so doing.27 Contractual liability that is based on the director’s internal relation-
ship will not be analysed in this dissertation. 
However, the above does not mean that the director has no duties whatsoever 
with respect to third persons. The director must refrain from causing damage to 
other persons’ life, health and assets; the director must perform the duties 
arising from the protection provisions provided by law and must not cause 
intentional damage contrary to good morals to third persons. Breach of the said 
duties may bring about tort liability of the director to third persons. 
What is meant by the director’s tort liability is liability for causing damage 
to third persons which is not based on contracts. Within the scope of this 
dissertation the author studied the following bases of the director’s tort liability: 
                                                     
26 This basis for a claim is specified in sections 187 (4) and (5) of the CC with regard to the 
private limited company and in sections 315 (4) and (5) of the CC with regard to the public 
limited company. 
27 Maivi Ots, Äriühingu juhtorgani liikme vastutus äriühingu võlausaldaja ees [Liability of 
the Members of the Management Bodies in Relation to the Creditors of the Company]. 
Master’s thesis (University of Tartu 2006) 44, 75. 
16 
 Breach of a protection provision. Pursuant to section 1045 (1) 7) of the 
LOA, the causing of damage is unlawful if the damage is caused by 
behaviour breaching a duty arising from law. In legal literature, the kinds of 
provisions that stipulate duties have also been called protection provisions.28 
Criteria for protection provisions have been determined in legal acts and 
literature only in general. A protection provision must establish the interest 
that is being protected and the manner in which it is being protected; also, it 
must be possible to derive a specific addressee of protection from the 
protection provision itself or from its purpose.29 Final assessment on whether 
the provision is a protection provision or not will be given through judicial 
practice.30 However, since judicial practice concerning protection provisions 
is constantly changing and developing, it would be complicated to present a 
full directory of protection provisions in the dissertation31 and doing that is 
not the objective of the dissertation either. 
The dissertation analyses one of the main protection provisions laid down 
for the protection of creditors – first sentence of section 180 (51) of the CC,32 
which provides for the obligation of the director of a permanently insolvent 
company to file the bankruptcy petition. Although the addressee of pro-
tection is not directly visible from the referred provision, it has been 
expressed in the judicial practice that the bankruptcy petition must, above 
all, be filed to protect the interests of creditors.33 
In addition, the author has also studied the probability of tort liability of 
the director on the basis of section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA in the case of thin 
capitalisation of the company. 
 Intentional behaviour contrary to good morals. Pursuant to section 1045 
(1) 8) of the LOA, the causing of damage is unlawful if the damage is caused 
by intentional behaviour contrary to good morals.  
The dissertation covers the possibility of tort liability of the director for 
intentional behaviour contrary to good morals primarily in the context of 
disclosure of untrue statements. Section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA is a uni-
                                                     
28 Paul Varul, Irene Kull et al, Võlaõigusseadus III, Kommenteeritud väljaanne [Law of 
Obligations Act III, Commented Edition] (Tallinn, Juura 2009) 650. 
29 Ingo Drescher, Die Haftung des GmbH-Geschäftsführers. 7th edn. (Köln, RWS Verlag 
Kommunikationsforum 2013) 227. 
30 E.g., in its judgement No. 3-1-1-41-11 of 3 June 2011 the Criminal Chamber of the 
Supreme Court has found that deceiving someone into making ungrounded bank transfers 
may be unlawful pursuant to section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA in co-effect with section 209 
(fraud) of Estonian Penal Code (karistusseadustik, hereinafter PC, State Gazette I, 2001, 61, 
364) as a tort protection provision. Also, see judgement of the Criminal Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of 30 November 2009 in court case No. 3-1-1-101-09. 
31 Examples on protection provisions see, for example, from Rolf Stürner, Arndt Teichmann 
et al, Jauernig Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit Allgemeinem Gleichbehandlungsgesetz. Kom-
mentar. 15th edn. (C.H.Beck 2014) Art. 823, Rn 43-45. 
32 With regard to public limited company, section 306 (31) of the CC. 
33 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 22 September 2005 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-79-05; 
judgement of the Supreme Court of 17 December 2009 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-150-09. 
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versal provision that is applicable in all cases when the director has behaved 
intentionally and that behaviour has been contrary to good morals. It is a 
provision that enables filing a compensatory claim in circumstances where 
there are no other effective grounds for filing compensatory claims, but the 
director has intentionally created an unfair situation that is contrary to the 
beliefs of an honest and fair person.34 The author has not thought it necessary 
to analyse all the situations in which the director could be held liable on 
tortious grounds for intentional behaviour contrary to good morals – studying 
the facts of different cases related to the behaviour contrary to good morals 
has little influence on the nature of liability deriving from section 1045 (1) 8) 
of the LOA; furthermore, composing a full directory of all cases related to 
the behaviour contrary to good morals would not be possible anyway due to 
the constant development of judicial practice. 
 Culpa in contrahendo (hereinafter also c.i.c.). The author has additionally 
analysed the liability of the director as the representative of the company for 
disclosure of untrue statements on the basis of c.i.c. It is arguable whether it 
is a case of contractual or non-contractual (tort) liability or the so-called 
reliance liability instead.35 The author has not analysed the legal nature of 
c.i.c. liability in the dissertation, but instead the question whether the director 
can be held liable to third persons on the basis of c.i.c.  
 
This dissertation does not cover the liability of the director for causing damage 
to legal rights on the basis of sections 1045 (1) 1) and 2) of the LOA pursuant to 
which, the causing of damage is unlawful if the damage is caused by causing 
the death of the person or causing damage to the health of the person. If the 
director causes bodily injury to another person, s(he) will be held liable for 
his/her tort irrespective of his/her official position. In some circumstances, 
causing damage to a person’s life or health may be specifically related to the 
                                                     
34 This is roughly how it has been tried to define behaviour contrary to good morals in 
German legal literature (In German Anstandsgefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden). See 
Kurt Rebmann, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland Rixecker, Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil III. Vol. V. 4th edn. (München, C. 
H. Beck 2004) 1898.  
35 In Estonia this issue has been studied more thoroughly by Urmas Volens in his disseration, 
Usaldusvastutus kui iseseisev vastutussüsteem ja selle avaldusmisvormid [Reliance Liability 
as an Independent System of Liability and Its Forms] (University of Tartu Press 2011). 
According to Volens, c.i.c. liability should be handled as a separate reliance liability next to 
contractual and non-contractual liability. In its judgement of 5 June 2013 in civil matter No. 
3-2-1-62-13 the Supreme Court has found that section 14 of the LOA that forms the basis of 
c.i.c. gives rise to an obligation between the negotiating parties and the person that breached 
the obligation will be held liable on the basis of section 115 of the LOA for non-performance 
of the duties arising from that obligation. However, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that 
the duties provided by sections 14 (1) and (2) of the LOA do not only apply to persons on 
whose behalf the negotiations are being held, but also to the representatives of those persons. 
The liability of the person taking part of the negotiations as the representative of the party 
for non-performance of obligations is, however, not based on section 115 of the LOA, but on 
section 1043 and section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA, i.e., the liability is tortious. 
18 
performance of the official duties of the director. For example, if a director 
places a company’s product on the market knowing that it may cause health 
damage (is toxic), the question arises: Should the victim, after all, find a 
protection provision or should s(he) prove that the director behaved inten-
tionally and contrary to good morals in order to hold the director liable? The 
director who has caused the death of the victim or damage to the health of the 
victim with his/her active behaviour could be held liable for the reason alone 
that his/her behaviour has caused the person’s death or damage to the person’s 
health.36  
The issue of possible tort liability of the director for breach of general duties 
to maintain safety will not be covered in the dissertation.37 
In the case of tort liability, it is grounded to talk separately about the pre-
conditions of liability and extent of liability (i.e., amount of the compensatory 
claim). The dissertation has primarily focused on the preconditions of liability; 
however, in some cases it has been necessary to pay attention to the extent of 
the claim as well to cover the issue (in the case of breach of the director’s duty 
to file the bankruptcy petition).  
The content of dissertation is limited to the analysis of the director’s tort 
liability which is why administrative (tax) and criminal liability is not studied. 
However, it should be briefly noted that the Estonian Supreme Court has 
recognised the possibility of the director’s tort liability in the case of failure to 
pay tax arrears due to the breach of the director’s duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition (section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA and section 180 (51) of the CC).38 The 
Supreme Court has noted in the referred decision that “section 180 (51) of the 
CC has the same effect on both the protection of the claims of private creditors 
and the protection of the tax claims of the state. Therefore, there is no reason to 
apply the said provision as a protection provision differently in the case of 
different claims.” 
                                                     
36 E.g., in Germany the director is held liable to third persons if health damage is caused 
during careless implementation of decisions that belong to the director’s area of 
responsibility. Gert Brüggemeier, Common Principles of Tort Law. A Pre-statement of Law 
(London, The British Institue of International and Comparative Law 2004) 148. In Spain, the 
director’s tort liability may also be possible if health damage or death of the person was 
caused through omission. E.g., tort liability of the directors of a mining company has been 
affirmed in judicial practice in a situation where the directors failed to take sufficient 
precautionary measures to avoid damage when a minor climbed on the territory of an 
abandoned mine and was hurt when coming into contact with the mining equipment located 
on the premises. The court noted that the directors had been grossly negligent by leaving the 
mine unattended, unfenced and without any warning signs. The court was of the opinion that 
by doing so the directors breached general safety requirements and requirements for the 
protection of third persons. Judgement of Spanish Supreme Court (STS) 22.01.2004 (RJ, 
2004/207). Spanish court decisions are available at http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/ 
indexAN.jsp (in Spanish). 
37 See on this: Iko Nõmm, Käibekohustuse rikkumisel põhinev deliktiõiguslik vastutus 
[Delictual Liability Based on the Breach of the Duty to Maintain Safety]. Dissertation 
(University of Tartu 2013) 83, 88. 
38 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 25 February 2013 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-188-12.  
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With regard to criminal liability, the author would like to note that criminal 
liability may intertwine with tort liability in a situation where the provision that 
provides the necessary elements of a criminal offence has also been recognised 
as a protection provision for the protection of creditors.39  
 
 
2.2.3. The Creditor of the Company as the Subject Entitled to 
Compensation for Damage 
This dissertation studies the liability of the director to the creditors of the 
company. The creditor of the company can be any third person who has a claim 
against that company. Therefore, the creditor can be a person who has a 
financial claim which arises from a contract (e.g., a claim arising from a loan 
agreement, a lease contract, a contract of sale). The creditor can also be a person 
who has a non-monetary fulfilment claim arising from a contract (e.g., a claim 
arising from the contract of sale for the delivery of a thing). The creditor can 
also be a person who has a (compensatory) claim arising from a breach of non-
contractual obligation.  
Creditors can be both legal and natural persons whereby the legal person can 
be a legal person in private or public law. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
legal persons in public law have, however, been considered as creditors only in 
those cases when that person has a civil claim against the company. As noted 
above, the compensatory civil claim of legal persons in public law may, for 
example, also arise from the decrease in the value of a tax claim.40  
Shareholders can be creditors of the company if they have a claim against 
the company. For the purposes of the dissertation, investment made into the 
company’s capital will not make shareholders creditors of the company. 
Pursuant to section 157 (4) of the CC, a shareholder has the right to demand 
payment of a dividend corresponding to his/her share only if it is so prescribed 
by a resolution of the shareholders.41 
Pursuant to section 32 of the GPCCA, the shareholders and the members of 
the directing bodies of a legal person must act in accordance with the principle 
of good faith and consider each other’s legitimate interests in their mutual 
relations. The nature of this legal relationship is disputable (is it a non-
contractual, contractual or maybe some in-between quasi-contractual relation-
ship instead)42 and worth discussing in a separate dissertation; therefore, this 
issue is not covered in the current dissertation. For that reason the author will 
not separately study the liability of the director to shareholders of the company. 
                                                     
39 E.g., the Estonian Supreme Court has recognised fraud (section 209 of the PC) as a 
protection provision in its judgement No. 3-1-1-41-11 of 3 June 2011. 
40 n 38. 
41 Corresponding provision on shareholders of public limited companies is section 279 (1) of 
the CC. 
42 Paul Varul, Irene Kull et al (n 11) 114. 
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3. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FIELD OF 
RESEARCH AND POSITION OF THE RESEARCH 
PROBLEM WITHIN IT 
On the entire topic of company law, no thorough law books have been 
published in Estonia to this day.43 Main contributors to the scientific research 
into company law in Estonia have been Andres Vutt and Margit Vutt, who have 
published several articles in various Estonian and foreign law journals.44 
Nevertheless, according to information available to the author, they too have not 
published any research articles that would explicitly have the director’s tort 
liability to company’s creditors as their object of research. 
Tort liability of the director of the company, which is the object of research 
of this dissertation, has to a small extent been covered in several dissertations 
defended at the University of Tartu. Margit Vutt has studied in her dissertation45 
the possibility of shareholders to file a derivative claim against the director of 
the company. The shareholder’s derivative claim is a compensatory claim 
against the director which is based on breach of a mandate originally belonging 
to the company and could, on certain conditions, be enforced by the shareholder 
in his/her name. Although Estonian law is lacking the possibility of filing 
shareholders’ derivative claims, Margit Vutt finds that it would be grounded to 
amend Estonian law accordingly and enable filing of shareholders’ derivative 
claims.46 The shareholder’s derivative claim against the director is substantially 
                                                     
43 Some works that resemble the form of handbooks and have a certain practical value have 
been published; however, a profound legal analysis is still missing. E.g., Paul Varul, Aldo 
Kaljurand et al, Äriühingu juhtorganid [Directing Bodies of Companies] (Äripäeva Kirjastus 
2005); Marko Kairjak (ed), Äriõigus, näidised ja kommentaarid [Commercial Law, 
Examples and Commentaries] (Äripäeva Käsiraamat 2013). 
44 E.g., Andres Vutt, Margit  Vutt, Äriühingu osaniku ja aktsionäri teabeõigus Eesti kohtu-
praktikas [Company’s shareholders’ right to information in Estonian judicial practice], in 
Juridica (9/2012) 709–716; Andres Vutt, Dividend payments and protection of minority 
shareholders, in Juridica International (16/2009) 135–140; Andres Vutt, Margit Vutt, 
Ühinemine ja jagunemine Eesti registri- ja kohtupraktika peeglis [Merger and division as 
reflected in Estonian registry and judicial practice], in Juridica (3/2009) 173–180; Andres 
Vutt, Some features of legal capital regulation in Estonia, in European Business Law Review 
(16(6)/2005) 1385–1392; Margit Vutt, Aktsionäri kahju hüvitamise nõue aktsiaseltsi ja selle 
juhtorgani liikmete vastu [Shareholder’s compensatory claim against the public limited 
company and the members of its directing body], in Juridica (2/2012) 90–100; Margit Vutt, 
Systematics of shareholder remedies – origins and developments, in Juridica International 
(2010) 188–198; Margit Vutt, Shareholder’s derivative claim – does Estonian company law 
require modernisation? in Juridica International (2/2008) 76–85; Margit Vutt, Legal 
regulation of the board structure of public limited companies in the light of regulatory com-
munication between the European Union and Member States, in Juridica International 
(11/2006) 118–128. 
45 Margit Vutt, Aktsionäri derivatiivnõue kui õiguskaitsevahend ja ühingujuhtimise abinõu 
[Shareholder’s Derivative Claim as a Legal Remedy and a Measure of Corporate 
Governance]. Dissertation (University of Tartu Press 2011). 
46 Ibid, 197. 
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different from the object of research of current dissertation since the share-
holder’s derivative claim is a contractual claim arising from internal relation-
ship, but the author of current dissertation studies tort liability of the director, 
i.e., direct liability to creditors based on external relationship. Margit Vutt has 
indeed touched upon the topic of tort liability of the director when defining her 
object of research; however, her dissertation dealt with the liability of the 
director to shareholders, not creditors.47 
Andres Vutt has, among other things, covered in his dissertation48 issues 
related to thin capitalisation of companies; however, Andres Vutt has not 
analysed the particular issue of the liability of the director in the case of thin 
capitalisation.  
Kalev Saare has studied the issue of legal person as the subject of law and 
distinguished the legal person from other pools of assets such as civil law 
partnerships, companies being founded, successors’ communities, but also from 
partnerships of persons, such as general and limited partnerships which 
according to German and Swiss law are not considered to be legal persons.49 
Kalev Saare has, among other things, raised the issue of distinguishing legal 
persons as subjects of law from natural persons acting under the cover and in 
the interests of legal persons as subjects of law. As one attribute for making the 
distinction, Saare has used the fact that legal persons can be held personally 
liable, which, in turn, relates to the liability of members of legal persons’ 
directing bodies both in internal and external relationships. Within that topic, 
Saare has also briefly covered the issue of liability of members of directing 
bodies (including tort liability) as an exception from independent sole liability 
of legal persons.50  
In his dissertation, Urmas Volens has studied reliance liability as an indepen-
dent system of liability.51 Herewith, studying the liability arising from pre-
contractual negotiations, i.e., culpa in contrahendo liability as one form of 
manifestation of reliance liability. In some exceptional cases, the director as a 
legal representative of a negotiating party (the company) may be held liable on 
the basis of c.i.c. for damage caused to the other negotiating party. Since some 
countries see c.i.c. liability as quintessentially tortious,52 the author of this 
                                                     
47 Ibid, 33 et seq. 
48 Andres Vutt, Legal Capital Rules as a Measure for Creditor and Shareholder Protection. 
Dissertation (University of Tartu Press 2011) 25 et seq. 
49 Kalev Saare, Eraõigusliku juriidilise isiku õigussubjektsuse piiritlemine [Determination of 
Legal Persons in Private Law as Legal Subjects]. Dissertation (University of Tartu 2004).  
50 Ibid 163 et seq. 
51 U. Volens (n 35). 
52 As there is no separate basis for a claim for c.i.c. in Spanish law, corresponding disputes 
are resolved based on general regulation of tort liability (section 1902 of Spanish Civil Code 
(Codigo Civil). Official State Bulletin [Boletín Oficial del Estado, BOE] BOE-A-1889-
4763). Spanish legislation is available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/ (in 
Spanish). For that reason c.i.c. liability is seen as tort in Spain. STS 16.5.1988. Gema Tomás 
Martínez, Naturaleza de la Responsabilidad Precontractual (Culpa in Contrahendo) en la 
Armonización Jurídica Europea, in Revista de Derecho (Coquimbo) (1/2010) 187-210, 
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dissertation has also studied the possible liability of the director on the basis of 
c.i.c. and, therefore, certain connection exists between this dissertation and the 
dissertation of Urmas Volens.53 
The topic which is the object of research of this dissertation has also been 
covered in some master’s theses in Estonia.54 
In brief, it may be said that different aspects of the director’s liability have 
been studied by only a few authors in Estonia so far. In the other countries of 
comparison, liability of the director has been studied much more profoundly. 
The topic is relevant in all countries under comparison since the optimum extent 
of the director’s liability is constantly changing, being dependent on how the 
economy is doing. For example, it was inevitable that directors had to take more 
risks and face more failures in their business during the years of financial crisis 
than during the years of economic growth. This, in turn, means that the issue of 
the liability of the director is more likely to rise during the years of crisis than 
during the good times. However, it is still evident that more severe liability of 
the director alone is not a precondition for economic recovery. Hence it is 
relevant in all countries under comparison to what extent protection of the 
interests of a single creditor (read: increasing the liability of the director) should 
be favoured over the economic growth as a whole (read: restricting the liability 
of the director and through that increasing his/her willingness to engage in 
enterprise). 
                                                                                                                                  
available at http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-97532010000100009&script=sci_ 
arttext, (last accessed on 25.3.2014). 
53 U. Volens (n 35) 283 et seq. 
54 E.g., M. Ots (n 27); Tuuve Tiivel, Äriühingu juhtorgani liikme kohustused ja vastutus 
[Duties and Liability of the Member of the Management Organ of the Company]. Master’s 
thesis (University of Tartu 2004). 
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4. METHODS 
The comparative method has been used as the main research method – the 
author has analysed the research questions comparatively in Estonian, German, 
English and Spanish law.  
Estonia is the country of author’s origin. Estonia has experienced a relatively 
recent legal transformation from a totalitarian regime to democracy and hence 
has the least developed legal practice from countries under comparison. From 
the perspective of Estonian law, comparison with German law is the most 
relevant, since it was German Civil Code (BGB)55 which was used as the main 
model law for Estonian Law of Obligations Act (including tort liability) that 
entered into force on 1 July 2002.  
In addition to the comparative analysis of Estonian and German law, the 
author has also analysed the research questions of the dissertation in English56 
and Spanish law. Both England and Spain represent principal legal families 
with long traditions, respectively the Anglo-American and the Romance legal 
family. Hence the comparative analysis of current dissertation covers Anglo-
American and main continental European (Romance, Germanic) legal families. 
The author has drawn new ideas from the comparison with English law on 
how to shape judicial practice, e.g. how it would be possible for the courts to 
apply more discretion in situations where the director has caused damage to the 
creditors by not filing the bankruptcy petition in due time, but it is not possible 
to unambiguously determine the size of the damage. 
In Spanish law, different approaches to the director’s liability can be found, 
which are of great interest from the point of view of the objective of this 
dissertation (e.g., the possible shifting of the liability of the director from the 
moment of insolvency to the moment of thin capitalisation). 
In trying to solve the research questions posed, an analysis of relevant 
Estonian, German, English and Spanish legal literature and legislation has been 
carried out in the dissertation. Validity of theoretical positions has been checked 
on the basis of judicial practice of respective countries. 
By comparing law and judicial practice in different countries, the author has 
been able to ascertain various possibilities for filing creditors’ tortious claims 
against the director. At the same time, the author has deliberated the risks 
related to the implementation of excessively severe liability. As a result of this 
                                                     
55 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereinafter BGB). Federal Law Gazette 
[Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBl] I p. 42, 2909, 2003 I p. 738. Information about the model laws 
used for the development of the LOA: Paul Varul, Irene Kull et al, Võlaõigusseadus I, 
Kommenteeritud väljaanne [Law of Obligations Act I, Commented Edition] (Tallinn, Juura 
2006) 2. 
56 For clarity, it should be noted that in addition to English law, the United Kingdom 
distinguishes between the Scots law and Northern Ireland law. The dominant law in the 
United Kingdom is mainly English law, which can be explained by London’s strong hold on 
the country’s economy and capital. For that reason, English law is the most studied and 
offers the most comprehensive judicial practice. 
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deliberation, the author has tried to determine the reasonable boundaries of the 
director’s tort liability and modelled some potential optimum solutions for filing 
tortious claims against the director. 
To a lesser extent, the author has also studied the historical development of 
certain issues. Unlike in Estonia, issues concerning the liability of the director 
have been studied and covered in legal practice for a long time in other 
countries of comparison. With regard to some issues, Estonian judicial practice 
is in the same place where, for example, German judicial practice was decades 
ago. Therefore, it was justified to study the historical development of respective 
countries of comparison additionally and draw parallels relevant to Estonia. For 
example, with respect to possible c.i.c. liability, German judicial practice has 
gone through a notable development since the 1960’s; when at first it was 
thought that the fact alone that the director is a shareholder is enough to hold the 
director personally liable, in the course of time the so-called personal economic 
interest as basis for liability has virtually been reduced to zero. However, the 
Estonian Supreme Court rendered only on 5 June 2013 the first decision which 
referred to personal economic interest as a supplementary condition of c.i.c. 
liability (the issue was, nevertheless, not explored in detail).57 Thus, the 
historical experience of German judicial practice is definitely relevant for 
current Estonian practice. 
  
                                                     
57 More thorough analysis in section 5.3.2 of the dissertation. 
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5. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF  
THE PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED IN THIS 
COMPENDIUM 
5.1. Obligation of the Director who has Breached  
the Duty to File the Bankruptcy Petition to Compensate 
for the Damage Caused to Creditors 
5.1.1. Compensation for Quota Loss of Old Creditors 
Description of the Problem 
Pursuant to section 180 (51) of the CC, the director is obligated to file the 
bankruptcy petition of the private limited company to a court without delay but 
not later than twenty days after the date on which permanent insolvency became 
evident.58 In judicial practice this provision has been recognised as a protection 
provision for creditors for the purposes of section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA 
enabling the creditors to file a compensatory tortious claim against the director 
who has breached the duty provided by that provision.59 
In the case of creditors whose claims already existed when the company 
became insolvent (also called ‘old creditors’), the purpose of section 180 (51) of 
the CC is to offer protection from damage caused by the decrease in the 
company’s assets. If the director has breached the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition, old creditors have the right to file a claim against the director for the 
compensation for quota loss. In order to calculate the amount of the claim it is 
necessary to determine the sum in which the respective creditor’s claim would 
have been satisfied when the bankruptcy petition had been filed in due time, and 
compare it to the sum that will actually be compensated – the difference 
between the hypothetical and actual extent of satisfaction of the claim is the 
quota loss, compensation for which can be claimed from the director.60 
In order to assess the hypothetical extent of satisfaction of the claim on the 
basis of which quota loss is calculated, it is necessary to establish two main facts: 
when did the company become permanently insolvent (the moment when the 
director was obligated to file the bankruptcy petition depends on that) and what 
was the exact volume of the assets and obligations of the company at that time 
(the hypothetical extent of satisfaction of the creditor’s claim depends on that)? 
                                                     
58 General provision regarding legal persons on filing the bankruptcy petition derives from 
section 36 of the GPCCA. Duty of the director of a private limited company to file the 
bankruptcy petition derives from section 180 (51) of the CC and similar duty of the director 
of a public limited company derives from section 306 (31) of the CC. 
59 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 6 May 2003 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-45-03. 
60 Pursuant to the principle of the hypothesis of difference provided by section 127 (1) of the 
LOA, the objective of compensation for damage is to place the damaged person in a 
situation as near as possible to that in which the person would have been if the circumstances 
which are the basis for the compensation obligation had not occurred. 
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If company’s accountancy is accurate, it will be rather easy to ascertain the 
said facts. However, in a situation of crisis it is understandable that organising 
accountancy may not be a priority for the director; furthermore, often it is the 
conscious choice of the director to leave accounting unorganised as it may make 
it more difficult to hold the director liable on civil grounds later on. In addition to 
unsatisfactory organisation of accountancy, in practice also destruction, conceal-
ment, misrepresentation and falsification of accounting records (e.g., ex post 
drafting of documents) can take place. What can also make it more difficult to 
hold the director liable on civil grounds is the breach of obligations provided in 
sections 85 to 87 of the BA (obligation to provide information, obligation to take 
an oath and obligation to participate in bankruptcy proceedings) by the director. 
Although the director may bear criminal liability for the breach of the duty to 
organise accountancy and the court may impose a fine or compelled attendance 
or detention on the director for breach of the obligations provided by sections 
85 to 87 of the BA, those breaches have basically no negative effect on the civil 
liability of the director; on the contrary, when the creditor’s evidential position 
weakens, it reduces the probability of satisfaction of the claim filed against the 
director as well. This creates a controversial situation in practice as the director 
who has breached the obligation to file the bankruptcy petition is motivated to 
conceal accounting records because the possibility of being held liable on civil 
grounds often outweighs the risk of criminal liability.61 
According to statistics, 58% of bankruptcy matters in Estonia are terminated 
by abatement without declaration of bankruptcy. In addition to that, 6% of 
bankruptcy matters are terminated by abatement after declaration of bankruptcy. 
From the perspective of creditors this means that in the case of abatement, their 
claims will remain fully unsatisfied. In bankruptcy proceedings that reach the 
stage of submitting of distribution proposals (i.e., 36% in total), in about 2/3 of 
the cases, creditors have their claims satisfied by less that 20% of the amount of 
their defended claims. Only in 9% of the cases have the claims of the creditors 
been satisfied by more than 50% (above data includes claims secured by a 
pledge).62 There are no grounds to presume that no abuse by the director took 
                                                     
61 E.g., pursuant to section 3811 of the PC, breach of obligation to keep records is punishable 
by a pecuniary punishment or up to three years of imprisonment. As a rule, breach of the 
obligation to keep records is not punished by imprisonment and the amounts of pecuniary 
punishment are rather modest. E.g., with its judgement of 14 December 2010 in criminal 
matter No. 1-10-15520 Harju County Court sentenced only a pecuniary punishment of 759 
euros to a convicted offender on the basis of section 3811 of the PC (court decisions of Esto-
nian courts of first instance and courts of appeal are available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ 
kohtuteave/maa_ringkonna_kohtulahendid/main.html (in Estonian)). As the director’s civil 
liability may amount to hundreds of thousands or even millions of euros, it is understandable 
that the director may be tempted to risk with a criminal punishment if that enables him/her to 
escape civil liability at the same time (due to unprovability). 
62 Survey on the effectiveness of insolvency proceedings during the period 1 January 2004 to 
30 June 2012 ordered by the Government Office of the Republic of Estonia. The survey  
has been carried out by AS PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisors and is available at 
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place in any of the abatement cases; it would rather be grounded to presume that 
if creditors’ claims are not satisfied, the director has probably breached the duty 
to file the bankruptcy petition on time.63  
Although in theory the creditor can file a tortious claim against the director 
when the duty stipulated in section 180 (51) of the CC has been breached, in 
practice such actions are often dismissed due to unprovability.64 It would even 
be more accurate to say that since according to the valid judicial practice, 
plaintiffs’ bear a very high burden of proof, creditors often waive their right to 
have recourse to the courts.65 Despite the fact that both section 127 (6) of the 
LOA and section 233 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter CCP)66 enable 
the court to determine the amount of damage according to the conscience of the 
court by taking account of all facts if the compensatory claims are difficult to 
prove, valid judicial practice does not support more extensive application of the 
discretion of the court when it comes to satisfaction of old creditors’ quota loss 
claims.67  
Based on the above, it can be stated that old creditors’ inability to enforce 
their tortious claims against the director in the court constitutes a massive 
problem in the economy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.just.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=58338/Maksej%F5uetuse+ 
menetlemise+t%F5hususe+uuring.pdf, (last accessed on 27.3.2014). 
63 Directors’ frequent malevolent delay in filing bankruptcy petitions has been pointed out in 
the study carried out by AS PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisors as well, ibid. 
64 E.g., in its judgement of 28 September 2012 in civil matter No. 2-09-67882 Harju County 
Court refused to satisfy a tortious claim filed against the director despite the fact that it was 
evident from the description of the facts and reasons for court judgment that abuse by the 
director might have taken place. With its judgement of 30 April 2013 Tallinn Circuit Court 
did not amend the referred judgement of Harju County Court. 
65 According to the database of court decisions, only three court decisions have been 
rendered in court cases where creditors have claimed compensation for damage from the 
director on the basis of section 180 (51) of the CC and section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA during 
the years 2012 and 2013. Out of those three decisions, claim of a creditor was satisfied by 
the judgement of Tartu Circuit Court of 20 April 2013 in civil matter No. 2-10-58837. By 
the judgement of Harju County Court of 23 February 2012 in civil matter No. 2-10-10257 
and of 28 September 2012 in civil matter No. 2-09-67882, creditors’ claims were left 
unsatisfied due to unprovability.  
66 Code of Civil Procedure (Est. tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik. State Gazette I, 2005, 26, 
197). 
67 Parties often dispute over damage and even if sufficient amount of evidence on the extent 
of damage has been submitted with the court, the court always proceeds from its own 
conscience to some extent and, therefore, making a separate reference to section 233 of the 
CCP is not always necessary. However, the dissertation refers to a situation where there is 
no direct evidence on the damage caused or the evidence is clearly insufficient. At the same 
time, however, other circumstances indicate that damage might indeed been caused. The 
author of the dissertation has not found any court decisions from the database of court 
decisions in which the court has directly proceeded from section 127 (6) of the LOA and/or 
section 233 of the CCP when determining the extent of quota loss.  
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Statement set forth for defence 
Enforcing quota loss claims the plaintiffs’ burden of proof should not be too 
high; to simplify the situation of plaintiffs, reversing the burden of proof or 
giving more discretion to courts on certain conditions should be considered. 
 
Reasoning 
In Estonia, application of greater discretion of the courts is enabled by section 
127 (6) of the LOA: if damage is established, but the exact extent of the damage 
cannot be established, including in the event of non-patrimonial damage or 
future damage, the amount of compensation must be determined by the court. 
As is visible from the wording of the provision, the provision is, above all, 
applicable to non-patrimonial and future damage. It could be presumed that in 
other cases (including in the establishment of quota loss) application of section 
127 (6) of the LOA is more likely only when exceptional circumstances occur. 
If it is debatable whether damage has been caused at all, application of section 
127 (6) of the LOA is also out of the question.  
In addition, according to section 233 (1) of the Estonian CCP the court 
decides on the amount of damage according to the conscience of the court and 
taking account of all facts if causing of damage has been established in a pro-
ceeding, but the exact amount of the damage cannot be established or establish-
ment thereof would involve major difficulties or unreasonably high costs, 
including if the damage is non-patrimonial. Even though the wording of section 
233 (1) of the CCP is different from the wording of section 127 (6) of the LOA, 
according to legal literature it is just a duplicate provision which has no addi-
tional qualitative effect.68 
As noted above, based on information available to the author, Estonian 
courts have not applied section 127 (6) of the LOA and section 233 of the CCP 
in disputes concerning old creditors’ quota loss and failure to prove the exis-
tence of quota loss has resulted in dismissal of the respective creditors’ claims 
against the director. As far as the author is aware, Estonian courts have not 
applied the rules of reversal of the burden of proof related to the concealment or 
destruction of evidence either in the referred situation.69 This creates an unfair 
situation where the director cannot be held liable on civil grounds when s(he) 
has left accounting unorganised to a substantial extent.  
Therefore, the author is of the opinion that it would be important to seek 
solutions which would make it easier to file claims for the compensation of 
                                                     
68 P. Varul, I. Kull et al (n 55) 448. 
69 Pursuant to sections 283 and 284 of the CCP, if the defendant refuses to submit the 
required (accounting) document or has removed the document or rendered it unusable, the 
court may deem the statements of the plaintiff concerning the nature and content of the 
document to be proven. Due to lack of corresponding judicial practice in Estonia, it is not 
known if and how those provisions could be applied in cases concerning tort liability of the 
director for the concealment of accounting records as a whole, also whether the said 
provisions could similarly be applied if instead of concealment or elimination of documents 
accounts have not been kept at all.  
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quota loss against the director who has breached the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition and, thereby, protect the interests of creditors to a larger extent. 
Out of the countries of comparison, in Germany liability of the director for 
quota loss (In German Quotenschaden) is, in general terms, regulated similarly 
to Estonia. If the obligation to file the bankruptcy petition is breached, it is pos-
sible to file a tortious compensatory claim against the director on the basis of 
section 15a (1) of German Insolvency Act (InsO)70 and section 823 (2) of the 
BGB; the amount of the claim will be calculated on the basis of the hypothesis 
of difference.71 Unlike in Estonia, this claim cannot be filed directly by the 
creditors; instead the trustee in bankruptcy files the corresponding claim against 
the director. Only when the bankruptcy proceedings are terminated, including in 
the event of abatement, may the creditors file an action directly against the 
director.72 Hence there are some procedural differences when compared to 
Estonian law. When in Estonia one specific creditor claims compensation for 
quota loss caused to him/her, in Germany the trustee in bankruptcy claims 
compensation for quota loss caused to all creditors.  
Differently from Estonia, Germany has a rather wide judicial practice in 
cases concerning the obstruction of the obtaining of evidence. If a person 
destroys or conceals evidence, making it impossible for the other party to prove 
certain facts, then depending on the circumstances, the burden of proof of the 
other party may be simplified or even reversed in German court proceedings.73 
Thus, it has been repeatedly recognised in German judicial practice that if the 
director has breached the statutory requirements of organising and maintaining 
accounting, making it difficult to prove the facts that form the basis of the 
action, prerequisites of insolvency may be deemed as proved.74 However, the 
author is not aware of any usage of the reversal of the burden of proof with 
respect to the amount of old creditors’ quota loss by German courts; therefore, 
according to German authors quota loss cases are rarely successful in 
Germany.75 It seems also that concentration of claims into the hands of the 
trustee does not give better results when compared to the possibility of each cre-
ditor enforcing the claim independently. The trustee is probably not motivated 
to commence an additional court action and creditors are not interested in 
financing proceedings (if there are no funds in the bankruptcy estate) from the 
proceeds of which they may only hope to get a fraction of the possible 
compensation.  
However, in England and Spain the courts have much more discretion in 
determining the amount of damage. Pursuant to section 214 of English 
                                                     
70 German Bankruptcy Act (Insolvenzordnung, Federal Law Gazette I p. 2866). 
71 Daniel Möritz, Haftung des Managements und Drittschutz (Nomos 2011) 121 et seq. 
72 Felix Steffek, Gläubigerschutz in der Kapitalgesellschaft (Mohr Siebeck 2011) 445–446. 
73 BGH 23 November 2005, NJW 2006, 434, 436. 
74 BGH 12 March 2007, ZIP 2007, 1060; BGH 24 January 2012, ZIP 2012, 723. Both court 
judgements are concerned with new creditors’ claims against the director who has breached 
the duty to file the bankruptcy petition. 
75 F. Steffek (n 72) 538–539. 
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Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), in a case of wrongful trading the court may 
declare that the director is to be liable to make such contribution (if any) to the 
company’s assets as the court thinks proper. However, despite the broad 
wording of the provision, it is not considered to be unlimited and penal liability. 
The objective of the discretion of courts is to overcome potential problems 
concerning the amount of damage and ascertaining of causation more easily and 
to avoid rendering unfair decisions.76 It enables the courts of England, diffe-
rently from Estonia and Germany, to take into account other facts, such as un-
satisfactory organising of accounting, more freely when determining the amount 
of damage.77 
Although English courts have more discretion, cases concerning directors’ 
compensatory claims are according to legal literature quite rare in English law 
as well. In addition to the difficulties related to the financing of proceedings, 
which most likely causes problems in all countries of comparison, it is compli-
cated in English law to define the starting point of the director’s liability.78 
Differently from Estonian and German law, in English law the director does not 
have an explicit duty to file the bankruptcy petition; however, pursuant to 
section 214 of the IA 1986, the court may order compensation from the director 
if damage has been caused some time before the commencement of winding up 
of the company, when the director knew or ought to have concluded that there 
was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation. To a large extent this is related to foreseeing of procedural con-
sequences by the director (the director had to know that there was no reasonable 
prospect to avoid the insolvent liquidation) and in practice the courts have 
ascertained the arrival of the so-called moment of truth a while after the com-
pany has become permanently insolvent.79 Therefore, in the comparable situa-
tion, the director of an English company may enter the zone of liability later 
than the director of a German (or Estonian) company, which also means that the 
probability that the director of the English company is held personally liable is 
lower than in the case of the director of the German (or Estonian) company.80 
It seems that out of the countries of comparison filing of a compensatory 
claim against the director who has breached the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition is the easiest in Spain. Pursuant to section 5 of Spanish Bankruptcy Act 
(LC)81, the director in Spain has, similarly to Estonian and German law, the 
duty to file the bankruptcy petition to have the bankruptcy of an insolvent 
                                                     
76 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law. 4th edn. First published 1990 
(Sweet&Maxwell 2011) 680–681. 
77 Purpoint Ltd [1991] BCLC 491. English cases available at Westlaw International legal 
database. 
78 Ian F. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency. 3rd edn (Sweet&Maxwell 2002) 711–712. 
79 F. Steffek (n 72) 354 et seq, 551. 
80 Thomas Bachner, Wrongful Trading Before the English High Court in European Business 
Organisation Law Review (5/2004) 199; F. Steffek (n 72) 461 et seq. 
81 Spanish Bankruptcy Act (Ley Concursal, Official State Bulletin [Boletín Oficial del 
Estado], BOE-A-2003-13813). 
31 
company declared.82 It is presumed that breach of the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition forms the basis of a wrongful bankruptcy (in Spain concurso culpable). 
In the case of wrongful bankruptcy, pursuant to section 172bis (1) of LC, the 
court may order partial or full compensation for the deficit of the bankruptcy 
estate from the director who breached his/her duty in proportion with how much 
the respective breach deepened the company’s insolvency. The purpose of the 
broad wording of the provision is to provide the courts with free discretion in 
situations when determination of damage is complicated.83 As breach of the 
obligation to keep records may also be one of the bases of wrongful bankruptcy, 
the court may, among other things, take into account the unsatisfactory orga-
nisation of accounting as well when determining the amount of compensation.84  
Based on the above, the author finds that the main problem concerning the 
enforcement of quota loss claims is the plaintiffs’ high burden of proof. In 
disputes over quota loss, the plaintiff is required to submit evidence on 
circumstances that are fully in the sphere of influence of the director (i.e., the 
defendant) and which the director can very easily manipulate to serve his/her 
own best interests.  
The author is of the opinion that relieving of creditors’ burden of proof 
should be considered and suggests two alternative possibilities for doing that:  
 
 Giving more discretion to courts. Providing the courts with more 
discretion in determining quota loss should be considered. The courts should 
take into account the breach of the obligation to keep records as a 
circumstance which would enable determination of the amount of com-
pensation for damage according to the conscience and at the discretion of the 
court. In addition to the breach of the obligation to keep records, breach of 
the obligation to cooperate during the bankruptcy proceedings may likewise 
damage the plaintiff’s evidential position.  
 
For instance, the Estonian CCP could be amended as follows (text added to the 
current wording is underlined):  
 
The court decides on the amount of damage according to the conscience of the 
court and taking account of all facts if causing of damage has been established 
in a proceeding but the exact amount of the damage cannot be established or 
establishment thereof is complicated as a result of the defendant having 
breached the obligation to provide information, the obligation to keep records or 
any other obligation to cooperate provided by law, or would involve major 
difficulties or unreasonably high costs, including if the damage is non-
patrimonial. 
                                                     
82 When in Germany and Estonia the director has respectively 21 and 20 days to file the 
bankruptcy petition then in Spain the term is two months. 
83 Fernando Marín de la Bárcena, La Acción Individual de Responsabilidad Frente los 
Administradores de Sociedades de Capital (Art. 135 LSA) (Marcial Pons 2005) 375 et seq. 
84 Section 164 (2) of the LC. 
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The author would like to emphasise that the breach of the obligation to keep 
records alone cannot automatically form a basis for the director’s tort liability. 
If the courts satisfied quota loss claims solely based on the fact that the director 
just happened to breach some accounting requirements, it could make the 
liability of the director sanctional, making it possible that the ordered compen-
sation for damage has no relations whatsoever to the breach of the director. 
Therefore, in addition to the fact that the obligation to keep records has been 
breached, the court must have a conviction based on evidence taken and other 
facts in aggregate that it is highly probable that damage has been caused by 
breach of the duty to file the bankruptcy petition, but proving it will be 
complicated since the director has also breached the obligation to keep records. 
 
 Reversal of the burden of proof. With regard to quota loss claims, reversal 
of the burden of proof could be considered in such a way that if it is 
probable85 that the defendant has breached the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition and with that damage to creditors might have occurred, but proving 
those facts has been rendered significantly more difficult due to the 
defendant’s own breach of the obligation to keep records (or any other 
obligation to cooperate provided by law), it is presumed that the defendant 
has both breached the duty to file the bankruptcy petition and, with that 
breach, caused damage to the extent of the deficit of the bankruptcy estate. 
The defendant may, in turn, prove that the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition has not been breached or no damage has been caused with that 
breach.  
 
In both cases – when providing the courts with more discretion and when 
reversing the burden of proof – the director’s possible tort liability is related to 
the breach of the obligation to keep records (or any other obligation to 
cooperate provided by law) by the director. It is something that is in the sphere 
of influence of the director and can easily be influenced by him/her – the 
director is able to manage the risks related to his/her liability by simply properly 
performing said obligations. Even if the obligation to keep records (or obli-
gation to cooperate in the bankruptcy proceeding) has been breached, but the 
director has not caused damage, the director has still possibility to prove that no 
damage has been caused. 
 
                                                     
85 Although assessment of probability in legal disputes is always subjective to a certain 
extent, in the given case, according to the assessment of the court the probability should be 
more than 50%. In other words, the probability that the director has caused damaged should 
be higher than the probability that the director has not caused damage. 
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5.1.2. Compensation for Reliance Loss of New Creditors 
Description of the problem 
The first time the Estonian Supreme Court recognised section 180 (51) of the 
CC as a protection provision for creditors was in one of its judgements in 
2003.86 Still, for a long time, no thorough analysis could be found from 
Estonian judicial practice on the protection purpose of section 180 (51) of the 
CC, i.e., from what kind of damage the corresponding provision should protect 
the creditors. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has noted in its judgement 
of 2009, “If a Circuit Court establishes that the defendant has breached the duty 
to file the bankruptcy petition, it must be assessed whether it has been proven 
that this breach has caused damage to the plaintiff.”87 However, the instructions 
of the Supreme Court were unclear about what kind of damage was meant. For 
that reason, the practice of lower courts has been inconsistent. For example, in 
its judgement of 1 February 2008 Tallinn Circuit Court ordered payment of the 
entire creditors’ claim and it was basically a sanctional compensation since, 
when rendering the judgement, the court did not establish the moment of 
insolvency, the exact amount of damage or causation.88  
With regard to a debtor company, there is reason to define its activities 
before and after the occurrence of permanent insolvency. Before the occurrence 
of insolvency, the company operates in usual economic environment89 by 
assuming obligations and receiving rights in return. The other party to the 
transaction bears the accompanying usual business risk that his/her business 
partner may become bankrupt sometime in the future. Yet in most cases it will 
be safe to assume that the business partner will not become insolvent in the near 
future. However, if the debtor has already become permanently insolvent, the 
situation changes fundamentally since the business partner joining in obligation 
with the debtor bears a considerable risk from the start that his/her claims 
against the debtor will not be satisfied.   
Therefore, it is justified to ask whether there would be reason to treat the 
creditors joining in the obligation after the occurrence of the debtor’s in-
solvency differently from the creditors joining in the obligation before the 
occurrence of the debtor’s insolvency. The answer to this question should be 
sought from the protection purpose of section 180 (51) of the CC – is the sole 
purpose of this provision to protect the creditors from the decrease in the 
debtor’s assets or should the provision also prevent the arising of new 
obligations? 
 
 
 
                                                     
86 n 59. 
87 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 17 December 2009 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-150-09. 
88 Judgement of Tallinn Circuit Court of 1 February 2008 in civil matter No. 2-04-1744. 
89 A separate question could be raised about the meaning of the so-called twilight zone when 
the company has clearly entered the hazard zone. Find out more from the next section.  
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Statement set forth for defence 
The courts should clearly distinguish between old and new creditors. Differently 
from the quota loss of old creditors, in the case of new creditors, new creditors’ 
reliance loss should be ordered from the director who has breached his/her duty 
to file a bankruptcy petition.  
 
Reasoning 
As noted above, the purpose of section 180 (51) of the CC is to protect the 
interests of creditors.90 Protection of the interests of creditors lies in the fact that 
if the director files the bankruptcy petition on time, control over the debtor’s 
economic activities will go to the bankruptcy trustee who is, pursuant to section 
55 (1) of the BA, obligated to defend the rights and interests of all the creditors 
and of the debtor and ensure a lawful, prompt and financially reasonable 
bankruptcy procedure. Pursuant to section 1 (3) of the BA, the company is 
insolvent if the assets of the company are insufficient for covering the 
obligations thereof and, due to the debtor's financial situation, such insuffi-
ciency is not temporary.91 Therefore, theoretically speaking, if the company’s 
obligations exceed its assets by one euro, the director should already file the 
bankruptcy petition.92 In that kind of a situation creditors’ claims would be 
satisfied almost to a full extent. However, the above statistics93 prove on the 
contrary that most bankruptcy proceedings in Estonia end in abatement, i.e., the 
extent of satisfaction of creditors’ claims is zero. Based on that, it can be 
claimed that the majority of directors fail to file the bankruptcy petition on time 
and keep the company in operation until it is without any assets. Therefore, the 
purpose of section 180 (51) of the CC is to protect creditors from the decrease in 
the debtor’s assets. If the duty to file the bankruptcy petition is breached, the 
creditors are entitled to claim compensation for quota loss to the extent in which 
the company’s assets decreased as a result of the director’s breach. 
An important question in this section is whether in addition to maintaining 
the company’s assets, section 180 (51) of the CC may have another protection 
purpose – to prohibit joining in new obligations with insolvent debtor. Pursuant 
to sections 35 (1) 2) and 4) of the BA, the right to administer the debtor’s assets 
is transferred, by declaration of bankruptcy, to the trustee and the company is 
deprived of the right to enter into any transactions.94 Although the bankruptcy 
of the company itself does not preclude that the trustee will conclude new 
                                                     
90 n 59. 
91 Pursuant to section 1 (2) of the BA, insolvency may also be related to the cash-flow, i.e., if 
the debtor is unable to satisfy the claims of the creditors and such inability is not temporary. 
The company is deemed to be permanently insolvent if the company is either in balance 
sheet insolvency (section 1 (3) of the BA) or cash-flow insolvency (section 1 (2) of the BA). 
92 Presumed that such negative capital is not temporary. 
93 n 62. 
94 Pursuant to section 18 of the BA, the court may apply measures for securing bankruptcy 
petitions already when deciding on the appointment of an interim trustee and prohibit the 
director from entering into transactions without the consent of the interim trustee. 
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contracts, such new creditors will have an advantage over the other creditors.95 
However, if the director continues to operate the insolvent company, new 
creditors will be in a complicated situation where it will be obvious already 
during the conclusion of the contract that satisfaction of their claims will not be 
very likely; later on in the bankruptcy proceedings they will be treated on even 
terms with the other creditors. Therefore, there is reason to claim that another 
purpose of section 180 (51) of the CC is to prevent the arising of new obli-
gations of an insolvent company.  
Unlike the old creditors’ quota loss, with regard to new creditors, damage 
that was caused as a result of abuse of their trust should be discussed. Both 
compensation for quota loss and reliance loss is based on checking the existence 
of causation; however, the important difference is with regard to what causation 
is checked. In the case of old creditors, it is checked on the level of causation 
whether the delay in filing the bankruptcy petition has caused the bankruptcy 
estate to decrease. In the case of new creditors, however, the size of the estate is 
not that important and it is checked on the level of causation whether the 
contract would have been concluded at all if the director had performed his/her 
duties as required. This kind of distinction is a result of different views on the 
protection purpose of the provision – with regard to old creditors, the purpose of 
the protection provision is to avoid the decrease in assets and through that offer 
protection to the existing creditors; however, with regard to new creditors, the 
protection purpose of the provision is to put a stop to entering into new 
contractual relationships with an insolvent company. However, if no clear legal 
dogmatic distinction has been made in judicial practice between the old and 
new creditors, giving proper meaning to the protection purpose of the provision 
will probably be complicated, which, in turn, may lead to mistakes in the 
application of causation.  
The Estonian Supreme Court rendered a decision on 25 February 2013 in 
which it, for the first time, clearly distinguished between the two protection 
purposes of section 180 (51) of the CC.96 The Supreme Court has noted the 
following in the said decision, “section 180 (51) of the CC protects the creditors 
of the company from two kinds of damage. First, filing of the bankruptcy 
petition on time must ensure that the company’s assets are maintained to as 
large extent as possible and through that the claims of creditors are satisfied to 
as large extent as possible. Second, filing of the bankruptcy petition on time 
must ensure that a company which is basically insolvent would not continue to 
participate in economic activities from which obligations may arise which the 
company is not able to perform.” 
Considering the inconsistent practice of Estonian lower courts so far, the 
Supreme Court could, nevertheless, have explained the respective issue more 
thoroughly. Based on the referred decision of the Supreme Court, it may still 
                                                     
95 Based on section 148 of the BA, it is a consolidated obligation, the performance of which 
will have priority pursuant to section 146 of the BA. 
96 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 25 February 2013 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-188-12. 
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remain unclear which creditor can claim compensation for which damage. For 
example, it is not evident from the decision of the Supreme Court, for which 
damage the creditor may claim compensation if the transaction has been entered 
into prior to the occurrence of insolvency, but the debt has incurred after the 
occurrence of insolvency, or even if the debt has incurred prior to the 
occurrence of insolvency, but it has been refinanced after the occurrence of 
insolvency? It remains unclear whether, as reliance loss, one may request 
compensation for claims arising from both contractual and non-contractual 
obligations, or whether it applies only to contractual obligations. The decision 
of the Supreme Court also does not provide an answer to the question what 
happens if the new creditor was aware of the insolvency of the debtor when 
concluding the contract. 
In Germany it has been recognised that the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition serves two protection purposes: first, it must ensure that the decrease in 
the assets of the company is avoided and it must protect from a decrease in the 
extent of claims of the creditors whose claims existed prior to the occurrence of 
insolvency (so-called protection of old creditors);97 second, filing of the 
bankruptcy petition on time must prevent the participation of an insolvent 
company in economic activities and, through that, avoid the arising of new 
obligations (so-called protection of new creditors).98 Differently from old 
creditors, determination of quota loss of new creditors is not necessary since 
what is being protected is new creditors’ reliance loss instead – damage that was 
caused because the new creditor entered into a transaction with an insolvent 
company (the entire negative damage of the new creditor is to be com-
pensated).99  
In German judicial practice, new creditors’ reliance loss claims are limited 
only by claims arising from contractual relationships, such as, granting of loans 
or making prepayments, since the purpose of the protection provision is to 
prevent conclusion of new contracts.100 However, if the new creditor has a 
contractual claim against a company, it is much easier to enforce the claim 
against the director as a reliance loss than as a quota loss because there is no 
need to prove how quota loss was caused and the entire negative damage, i.e., 
direct damage that was caused to the creditor as a result of the conclusion of the 
contract, will be compensated.101 Unlike the old creditors’ quota loss claims, 
new creditors may enforce their reliance loss claims directly (i.e., without the 
mediation of the trustee).102 As enforcement of the claims of new creditors is 
                                                     
97 D. Möritz (n 71) 121 et seq. 
98 Michael Hoffmann-Becking, Achim Herfs et al, Münchener Handbuch des Gesell-
schaftsrechts, Aktiengesellschaft. Vol. IV. 2nd edn. (C.H.Beck 1999) 290. 
99 Wilhelm Uhlenbruck, Heribert Hirte, Insolvenzordnung, Kommentar. 13th edn. (Verlag 
Franz Vahlen 2010) 312 
100 BGH 8.3.1999, ZIP 1999 p 967. 
101 E.g., objective value of sold goods could be compensated as a negative damage, but not 
the loss of income due to the seller’s markup. I. Drescher (n 29) 244–245. 
102 F. Steffek (n 72) 445–446. 
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easier from the evidential point of view and new creditors may have their claims 
satisfied to a larger extent than the old creditors, new creditors’ reliance loss 
cases prevail in German judicial practice.103 
Differently from German law, English law prefers equal treatment of 
creditors and there is no clear distinction between the old and new creditors. 
Although it is, in principle, possible for courts to take into consideration the 
abuse of new creditors’ interests when determining the amount of compen-
sation, it will not influence the distribution ratio paid to the new creditor since 
according to English courts, the purpose of section 214 of the IA 1986 is to 
compensate damage to creditors as a whole and claims of new creditors should 
not be preferred to the claims of old creditors.104 
In Spanish legal literature, ambivalent opinions have been expressed 
concerning the position of new creditors. Pursuant to section 172bis (3) of the 
LC, amounts ordered from the director are received in the bankruptcy estate and 
distinguishing between old and new creditors is not possible when making 
payments. However, in literature the distinction between old and new creditors 
has been made105 and filing of new creditors’ reliance loss claims in parallel 
with bankruptcy proceedings has, in principle, been considered possible on the 
basis of section 241 of Spanish Companies Act (TRLSC).106 
Based on the above said, the author is of the opinion that an old creditor is 
the kind of creditor who has joined in contractual obligation with the debtor 
prior to the occurrence of permanent insolvency of the debtor, irrespective of 
the moment when the claim has became enforceable. The old creditor bears the 
usual business risk related to the possibility that the debtor goes bankrupt and in 
the case of the old creditor, compensation for reliance loss is not grounded. 
Even if the claim becomes enforceable after the occurrence of insolvency, it 
does not change the position of the old creditor to the debtor since it may be 
presumed that the debtors’ insolvency could not be foreseen and, therefore, 
there is no reason to claim that the director has abused the old creditor’s trust. In 
authors’ opinion the same principle should be applied to recurring obligations 
and obligations performed in parts (e.g., monthly rent or loan payments) if the 
contractual relationship was entered before the occurrence of permanent 
insolvency of the debtor. The actual moment when insolvency occurred is of 
decisive importance when assessing the occurrence of insolvency. A term 
                                                     
103 Ibid, 468. 
104 Purpoint Ltd [1991] BCLC 491. 
105 Guillermo Guerra Martín, Alberto Alonso Ureba et al, La Responsabilidad de los 
Administradores de Sociedades de Capital. 1st edn. (Wolters Kluwer España, La Ley 2011) 
161. 
106 Spanish Companies Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital, Official 
State Bulletin [Boletín Oficial del Estado], BOE-A-2010-10544). Section 241 of the TRLSC 
is a provision in Spanish law that forms the basis for filing direct claims that are based on 
external relationships against the director (in Spanish acción individual). See SAP CS 
1534/2000, 2.10.2000; also Angel Rojo, Emilio Beltrán, Comentario de la Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital. Vol. I. (Thomson Reuters 2011) 1735. 
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established by law for submission of the bankruptcy application107 should have 
no importance here as the objective of said term is not to continue the economic 
activities of an insolvent debtor, but to assess the reorganisation possibilities of 
the debtor and prepare for the filing of the bankruptcy petition.108 
The position of the new creditor is, however, not related to the bearing of the 
usual business risks; with regard to new creditors, one can speak about abuse of 
trust right from the start. When the company’s insolvency becomes evident, the 
director is obligated to file the bankruptcy petition with the court and that 
bankruptcy petition will form the basis for removing the company from 
economic circulation and precluding the arising of new contractual obligations. 
The economic substance of contractual obligations is important at this point as 
well – if joining in the contractual obligation formally takes place after the 
occurrence of insolvency, but substantially the debt has incurred prior to 
insolvency (e.g refinancing), there is no reason to speak about damaging of that 
creditor’s trust. The author supports the position expressed in German judicial 
practice that compensation for reliance loss may be claimed by creditors whose 
claims have arisen from contractual relationships. The author finds additionally, 
creditors whose claims arise from the reversal of cancelled or void contracts, 
should be able to claim compensation for reliance loss. However, in the case of 
tort, for example, there is no reason to speak about trust violated by the director. 
For the same reason, the author is not a proponent of compensating for reliance 
loss of those new creditors who were aware of the companys’ insolvency when 
they concluded the contract, as their trust has not really been violated.109 
However, if the creditor is unable to enforce his/her claim as reliance loss, s(he) 
may file it as a quota loss claim.  
The author is of the opinion that clear identification of new creditors and 
recognition of their reliance loss claims enables better protection of the interests 
of new creditors as filing of new creditors’ claims against the director is 
considerably easier when compared to the filing of old creditors’ quota loss 
claims (no need to prove quota loss). Distinguishing between new creditors and 
old creditors does not mean that some creditors are preferred over the others 
since the company will still be held equally liable to all creditors. In the given 
                                                     
107 In Estonia 20 days, in Germany 3 weeks (i.e 21 days), in Spain 2 month. 
108 Pursuant to section 180 (51) of the CC, the bankruptcy petition must be filed promptly 
after the date on which the insolvency became evident. The twenty-day term provided by the 
same section does not mean that irrespective of the circumstances, the director could always 
delay twenty days with the filing of the bankruptcy petition and meanwhile carry on with 
everyday economic activities. The purpose of the said term is to provide the director with the 
opportunity to further check the solvency of the company, assess reorganisation possibilities 
(including conduct negotiations with creditors, investors and shareholders) and make 
preparations for filing the bankruptcy petition depending on the specific circumstances. On 
the purpose of the term for filing the bankruptcy petition, see also: I. Drescher (n 29) 233. 
109 E.g., if a creditor grants a reorganisation loan to an insolvent company, the risk of the 
company going bankrupt later on is ‘written’ in their loan agreement right from the start (on 
the presumption that the director has adequately informed the creditor of the company’s 
solvency). 
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case, however, it is the question of the director’s tort liability and it is grounded 
to separately assess what kind of protection purpose the director has breached 
by failing to perform the duty to file the bankruptcy petition. The author finds 
that more severe liability of the director in this matter does not suppress his/her 
spirit of entrepreneurship since it is clearly in the director’s own power to file 
the bankruptcy petition and breach of that duty cannot come as a surprise to the 
director. Furthermore, the author does not believe that encouragement of 
economic activities of insolvent companies would have a positive effect on the 
development of business activity and economy. 
 
 
5.2. Obligation of the Director who has Failed to Act in 
the Case of Thin Capitalisation of the Company to 
Compensate for the Damage Caused to Creditors 
Description of the problem 
The concept of companies’ limited liability is based on their capital – pursuant 
to section 135 (2) of the CC, a shareholder is not personally liable for the 
obligations of the private limited company.110 Liability of a shareholder is 
limited to the capital paid by the shareholder. Thus, the capital of the company 
acts as a guarantee for creditors’ claims and it is important to the creditors that 
the capital would be maintained at least in the minimum amount provided by 
law.111  
Pursuant to section 171 (2) 1) of the CC, the director is obligated to call a 
meeting of shareholders if the net assets (total assets minus total obligations 
shown under liabilities on a balance sheet) of the private limited company are 
less than one-half of the share capital or less than the amount of share capital 
specified in section 136 of the CC or other minimum amount of share capital 
provided by law.112 Pursuant to section 176 of the CC, the general meeting 
should decide on a reduction or increase of capital of the company, liquidation, 
transformation, dissolution or declaration of bankruptcy of the company or the 
implementation of other measures.113 If, however, the general meeting does not 
take any decisions or if the decision taken is not adequate to overcome thin 
capitalisation114 then in Estonia, the director has no other obligations or 
additional liability with regard to thin capitalisation of the company. Only after 
thin capitalisation has developed into permanent insolvency the director has an 
additional obligation based on section 180 (51) of the CC to file the bankruptcy 
petition with the court. 
                                                     
110 Corresponding provision on shareholders of public limited companies is section 221 (2) 
of the CC. 
111 T. Raiser, R. Veil, Recht der Kapitalgesellschaften (Verlag Franz Vahlen 2010) 328  
112 Corresponding obligation of the director of a public limited company derives from 
section 292 (1) 1) of the CC. 
113 Corresponding provision on public limited companies is section 301 of the CC. 
114 E.g., a decision is taken to wait for better times to come. 
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The thin capitalisation fact alone does not mean inevitable insolvency of the 
company. There are many companies that operate in the conditions of thin 
capitalisation.115 Nevertheless, it is evident that a company which experiences 
thin capitalisation operates in a so-called twilight zone and thin capitalisation 
may be transformed into permanent insolvency. Based on accounting logic, in 
terms of balance sheet, thin capitalisation is one step away from permanent 
insolvency. The majority of insolvent companies have been in thin capitali-
sation stage prior to insolvency.116  
According to the above statistics, more than half of the bankruptcies in 
Estonia are without assets and end in abatement.117 One reason for bankruptcies 
without assets is the fact that liquidation activities are commenced too late. 
However, even if some assets remain in the bankruptcy estate that enable 
satisfaction of creditors’ claims, for example, by 20%, it still means that the 
director has allowed the capital to become greatly negative before taking any 
decisive actions. 
Pursuant to section 203 (1) 1) of the CC,118 failure to act in the case of thin 
capitalisation may result in compulsory dissolution of the company on the basis 
of a court ruling. Andres Vutt has found in his dissertation that state inter-
vention in that manner is not justified and has no effect on the protection of the 
interests of shareholders and creditors. For that reason, Andres Vutt proposes in 
his dissertation to annul section 203 (1) 1) of the CC119 in the part in which the 
law enables the court to dissolve a company which is in the state of thin 
capitalisation.120 
The author agrees that compulsory dissolution on the basis of section 203 (1) 
1) of the CC may not assure effective protection to shareholders and creditors. 
However, the author thinks that partial annulment of section 203 (1) 1) of the 
CC, as proposed by Andres Vutt, alone would be insufficient since the question 
on how to ensure better protection of the shareholders and creditors in the case 
of thin capitalisation of a company would not be solved. Removal of the option 
of compulsory dissolution by court ruling by itself would assure neither 
                                                     
115 Cubelock Ltd [2001] BCC 523. Explanation by Park J on common practice where 
shareholders’ equity of companies that have just started their business is often negative and 
the capital of companies already in operation may temporarily become negative, which does 
not mean wrongful trading yet. 
116 Of course, the net assets of an insolvent company are also less than the statutory 
minimum as in the case of thin capitalisation. In the dissertation, the author distinguishes 
between thin capitalisation and permanent insolvency. For the purposes of this dissertation, a 
company is considered as experiencing thin capitalisation if its shareholders’ equity is less 
than the statutory minimum, but it has not become permanently insolvent yet. A company is 
considered to be permanently insolvent if its obligations exceed the assets or it is not able to 
constantly fulfil its payment obligations (i.e., the company experiences thin capitalisation, 
but in addition to that is also permanently insolvent).  
117 n 62. 
118 Similar provision on public limited companies is section 366 (1) 1) of the CC. 
119 In the case of public limited companies, section 366 (1) 1) of the CC. 
120 A. Vutt (n 48) 43–44.   
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performance of statutory capital requirements nor getting the company out of 
the so-called twilight zone.  
In the dissertation, the author has analysed the possibility of filing a com-
pensatory claim against the director when the director fails to act in the case of 
thin capitalisation. If the creditors had the option to at least partially file their 
unsatisfied claims against the director, creditors’ rights would be protected to a 
greater extent and it would contribute to initiation of the liquidation or 
bankruptcy proceedings of the company at an earlier stage when the company 
still has assets on account of which creditors’ claims could be satisfied. 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
The breach of the duty to call a general meeting alone cannot bring about tort 
liability of the director to the creditors of the thinly capitalised company. In 
order to form a basis for directors’ personal tort liability the director should be 
additionally obligated to file a petition with the court for compulsory dissolution 
of the company if the general meeting of the company has not taken place in 
due time or if the general meeting has decided to liquidate the company or if the 
general meeting has not adopted any appropriate decision. The breach of said 
additional obligation should enable damaged creditors to file direct tort claims 
against the director. 
 
Reasoning 
Pursuant to section 171 (2) 1) of the CC, the director is obligated to call a 
general meeting if the net assets of the company are less than the statutory 
minimum. The said provision embodies a duty of the director and it may have a 
purpose to protect third persons as well. Therefore, it could be discussed 
whether it is a protection provision for the purposes of section 1045 (1) 7) of the 
LOA, which would enable creditors to file a compensatory tortious claim 
against the director. 
Estonian courts of first instance have repeatedly seen section 171 (2) 1) of 
the CC as a protection provision, the purpose of which is to offer protection to 
creditors.121 In later judicial practice, however, Tallinn Circuit Court has called 
into question whether section 171 (2) 1) of the CC is a protection provision 
provided for the protection of creditors. The Circuit Court sent the matter back 
to the lower court for rehearing with instructions to separately verify whether 
the protection purpose of section 171 (2) 1) of the CC is indeed to offer pro-
tection to creditors. For some reason the Circuit Court itself did not declare a 
final position in this matter.122 Based on information available to the author, the 
                                                     
121 Judgement of Harju County Court of 30 October 2008 in civil matter No. 2-07-46119; 
judgment of Tartu County Court of 23 October 2007 in civil matter No. 2-07-13801. 
122 Judgement of Tallinn Circuit Court of 21 December 2010 in civil matter No. 2-09-44968. 
In the later proceeding, the County Court did not analyse the protection purpose of section 
171 (2) 1) of the CC in its judgement of 28 September 2011, but instead, established the 
breach of the director’s duty to file the bankruptcy petition (section 180 (51) of the CC), 
which also formed a basis for partial satisfaction of the action against the director. 
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Supreme Court of Estonia has so far not rendered any judgements in the matter 
under discussion. 
The author considers section 171 (2) 1) of the CC not to be a protection 
provision that offers protection to creditors. The said provision only provides 
the duty of the director to call the general meeting. Pursuant to section 292 (3) 
of the CC, a special general meeting of the public limited company will not be 
called if the time between becoming aware of the decrease in the assets and the 
annual general meeting is less than two months.123 Based on that, it can be 
concluded that the maximum amount of time that may remain between the 
occurrence of thin capitalisation and taking place of the respective general 
meeting is two months. Nevertheless, even if the general meeting is called on 
time, it does not give a guarantee that the general meeting will take a decision to 
overcome thin capitalisation. The director can only make propositions, but 
cannot assure that decisions are taken on the basis of those propositions (on the 
presumption that the director is not a majority shareholder at the same time). 
Should the general meeting decide to do something to improve the state of 
capital, it could only indirectly and reflectively also protect the interests of 
creditors.124 However, should the general meeting decide not to do anything, the 
director will have formally performed his/her duties, but the interests of 
creditors will have been left unprotected.  
Out of the countries of comparison Germany has a similar regulation in 
section 49 (3) of the GmbH Act125, pursuant to which the director is obligated to 
call a general meeting if half of the share capital of the company has been spent. 
According to German authors, the purpose of the referred provision is to protect 
the interests of shareholders, inform them about the economic difficulties the 
company is experiencing and enable them to apply appropriate measures 
promptly. Although this may indirectly also be in the interests of creditors since 
there is less chance of a company going bankrupt when the duties of the director 
are performed as required, for the purposes of section 823 (2) of the BGB this 
provision is still not a provision that provides protection to creditors.126  
A regulation similar to that of Estonian and German law for calling a general 
meeting is provided in English law as well.127 However, creditors cannot file 
                                                     
123 There is no similar provision for the private limited company; however, the author is of 
the opinion that it would be justified to apply the same provision to private limited 
companies as well. 
124 E.g., a decision to increase the company’s capital will decrease the risk of the company 
becoming insolvent and increase the probability of creditors having their claims satisfied. 
125 German GbmH Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, 
Federal Law Gazette I p. 2586). 
126 Marcus Lutter, Peter Hommelhoff et al, GmbH-Gesetz, Kommentar. 18th edn. (Köln, 
Verlag Otto Schmidt 2012) 1321; G. Crezelius, V. Emmerich et al, Scholtz Kommentar zum 
GmbH-Gesetz. Vol. II. 9th edn. (Verlag Otto Schmidt 2002) 2586; Lutz Michalski, G. 
Dannecker et al, Kommentar zum Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit begrenzter 
Haftung (GmbH-Gesetz) Vol. II (C.H.Beck 2002) 1025–1026. 
127 Art. 656 of English Companies Act 2006. 
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tortious claims against the director who has breached the duty to call a general 
meeting in England either.128 
An interesting solution is provided in Spanish law. Pursuant to section 367 
of the TRLSC, a director is solidarily liable with the company for the 
performance of contractual obligations that have arisen after the occurrence of 
the bases for dissolution of the company (in Spanish causa de disolución). One 
such basis for dissolution may be thin capitalisation of the company. The 
director is obligated to call a general meeting that could take a decision to 
eliminate the respective basis for dissolution or liquidate the company within 
two months after the occurrence of thin capitalisation. However, if the general 
meeting does not take such a decision or if the general meeting does not take 
place or if the general meeting does take the decision, but it does not enable 
elimination of thin capitalisation, the director is according to Spanish legal 
literature obligated to file a petition for liquidation of the company (or file a 
bankruptcy petition if a basis for that exists).129  
Upon breach of the above-mentioned duties, direct liability of the director to 
the creditors of the company may arise. However, it will not be tort liability, 
but, according to the prevailing opinion, sanctional liability instead (in Spanish 
sancion civil).130 Spanish Supreme Court has emphasised that it is objective 
liability of the director, which is neither dependent on causation nor even the 
size of damage. It is merely important to establish that statutory duties of the 
director have been breached in the case of thin capitalisation of the company.131 
As there is no corresponding restriction deriving from law, the director will be 
held liable irrespective of the basis of the creditor’s claim (including for 
satisfaction of creditors’ claims arising from employment and non-contractual 
obligations).132 
The author finds that the duty of the director to convene a general meeting of 
thinly capitalised company does fulfil the objective of informing shareholders, 
but does not automatically ensure sustainability of the company’s economic 
activities. The purpose of the provision that provides the said duty is not the 
protection of creditors. Therefore, even if the director has breached the 
respective duty, it is not possible for the creditors to claim compensation for 
damage from the director. 
The author thinks that in addition to the duty to call the general meeting, the 
director should have the duty to liquidate the company (or file a bankruptcy 
petition if basis for that exists) if the general meeting has not taken place in due 
time or if the general meeting decided to liquidate the company or if the 
decision of the general meeting is insufficient for eliminating thin capitalisation 
(including when the general meeting does not take any decision at all). 
                                                     
128 F. Steffek (n 72) 295–296. 
129 G. Guerra Martín, A. Alonso Ureba et al, (n 105) 238. 
130 Angel Rojo, Emilio Beltrán, Comentario de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital. Vol. II. 
(Thomson Reuters 2011) 2575 et seq. 
131 STS 3900/2010, 30.6.2010. 
132 G. Guerra Martín, A. Alonso Ureba et al (n 105) 267. 
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In Estonia, for example, section 203 of the CC could be supplemented with a 
new subsection 21 in the following wording:133  
 
If the net assets of a private limited company decrease below the limit provided 
by section 171 (2) 1) of this Code, the director is obligated to file a petition for 
dissolution of the company no later than twenty days after the date on which the 
general meeting took place or should have taken place if: 
1): the general meeting has so decided pursuant to section 176 2) of this Code; 
2): the general meeting has taken any other decision provided in section 176 of 
this Code, but the decision is not sufficient to bring the net assets of the 
company into accordance with the statutory requirements within the term 
provided by this subsection; or  
3): the general meeting has not taken any decision at all. 
 
The said new provision would similarly to section 180 (51) of the CC be aimed 
at terminating the activities of the company and liquidating the company during 
which the liquidator has the duty pursuant to section 209 (2) of the CC to 
terminate the activities of the private limited company, collect debts, sell assets 
and satisfy the claims of creditors. Pursuant to section 209 (3) of the CC, the 
liquidators may only conclude transactions which are necessary for liquidation 
of the private limited company. Therefore, the decrease in the company’s assets 
due to further unprofitable economic activities should come to a stop through 
liquidation and the remained assets should be used for the specific purpose of 
satisfying creditors’ claims. The author is of the opinion that it would be 
justified to treat this new provision as a protection provision for creditors 
similarly to section 180 (51) of the CC for the purposes of section 1045 (1) 7) of 
the LOA. 
Unlike Spanish law, the author is not in favour of sanctional liability of the 
director; instead, the director should be held liable to creditors on tortious 
grounds similarly to the breach of the duty to file the bankruptcy petition; 
however, with the exception that the moment of potential liability of the director 
for failure to act in the case of thin capitalisation would occur prior to the 
company becoming permanently insolvent. 
The offered solution would enable better protection of the interests of 
creditors since more severe personal liability would force the director to take 
the reorganisation of the company in the occurrence of thin capitalisation more 
seriously and apply measures to avoid further decrease in the assets sooner. 
From the perspective of the director, this kind of more severe liability would not 
come unexpected. The director has the duty to maintain the reports in any case 
and thin capitalisation of the company cannot come as a surprise to the director. 
When thin capitalisation occurs, the director has quite long time to call a 
                                                     
133 With regard to public limited company, subsection 21 should be added to section 366 of 
the CC. 
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general meeting.134 This time can be used to consider all possible ways for 
reorganisation of the company.135 The author finds that if it is obvious by that 
time that bringing the company’s capital into accordance with the statutory 
requirements is hopeless and it is probable that the company may become 
insolvent, it is justified to impose the duty to terminate the activities of the 
company on the director. 
The proposed solution, nevertheless, has its risks as it may motivate directors 
to dissolve sustainable companies whose thin capitalisation is temporary or 
where thin capitalisation is merely a matter of accounting.136 Still, the author 
thinks that the director should call a general meeting in the case of thin 
capitalisation of the company anyway. If thin capitalisation is temporary (e.g., 
in the case of a company starting its business), the director together with the 
shareholders can assess the risks associated with the continuing of activities in 
the situation of thin capitalisation and if thin capitalisation of the company does 
not affect the company’s solvency, the director may also remain inactive 
because if no damage is caused, no claims against the director can arise. If the 
company’s thin capitalisation is only an accounting issue then that kind of thin 
capitalisation can most likely be easily removed from the book records. 
However, if thin capitalisation may have an actual negative effect on the 
company’s solvency, the shareholders must, after all, find ways to restore the 
capital. The author is of the opinion that in that kind of situation, business risks 
should be taken at the expense of shareholders and not creditors. If the 
shareholders are not willing to bear that risk, the director should take steps in 
order to liquidate the company. However, if (s)he remains inactive in the 
situation of thin capitalisation, the director should be held liable for damaging 
the interests of creditors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
134 In Estonia, for instance, the director has to call the general meeting in 2 month after 
occurance of thin capitalisation. See n 123. 
135 Some examples about proper and adequate actions in the twilight zone of a company are 
pointed out in the Uncitral Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part four: Directors` 
Obligations in the Period Approaching Insolvency (New York, United Nations 2013) 10– 
12. Available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-
ebook-E.pdf (last accessed on 2.2.2015). 
136 E.g., the company’s share capital has been fictitiously increased by non-monetary 
contribution. Later, market value of assets has significantly decreased and caused net assets 
to fall below one-half of the share capital. At the same time, the company’s total amount of 
liabilities is not big and its economic activities yield a profit. 
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5.3. Liability of the Director for Disclosure of  
Untrue Statements 
5.3.1. Liability for Intentional Disclosure of Untrue Statements 
Description of the problem 
It may be generalised that when creditors lose money, it is always related to 
inaccurate assessment of business risks. Herewith, the inaccurate assessment 
may be objective (based on unexpected changes in the economic environment 
that could not be foreseen) or subjective (based on the creditor’s own erroneous 
understanding of the economic environment, other party to the transaction or 
object of transaction). The creditor’s subjective mistake may be the result of 
his/her lack of knowledge or an untrue perception created by the other party. 
Although the parties always have a certain common interest in the transaction 
(otherwise the transaction would not be concluded at all), the interests of the 
parties often lead them in separate directions (the seller wants to sell for the 
highest possible price and the buyer wants to buy for the lowest possible price). 
Therefore, it may often be that the parties tend to present facts in a more 
favourable light than they actually are or hide circumstances that when known 
could harm the party’s position in negotiations. It could be any fact concerning 
the party’s experiences and capabilities in the performance of the contract, the 
object of the contract or some other fact relevant for the performance of the 
contract. 
Section 1045 (1) 8) of the Estonian LOA, pursuant to which, the causing of 
damage is unlawful if the damage is caused by intentional behaviour contrary to 
good morals, could be pointed out as one possible basis of liability for disclo-
sure of untrue statements. It is a universal provision applicable in all situations 
when a person has behaved intentionally and contrary to good morals.  
As a precondition for applying section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA, the 
defendant’s intent must be established and also that the defendant’s behaviour 
was contrary to good morals. Intent does not necessarily have to be aimed at 
causing damage to the other party. It is sufficient if intent is aimed at breach and 
the defendant was aware or should have been aware that the breach could cause 
damage to the other party.137 Sometimes, however, an act which is in accor-
dance with good morals can turn into an act that is contrary to good morals if it 
is established that intent was specifically aimed at causing damage to the 
victim.138 
How good morals are assessed, depends on judicial practice. In its judge-
ment of 5 June 2013 the Supreme Court has covered the possibility of the 
liability of the director on the basis of section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA and taken 
the position that double-sale of assets alone does not give grounds to say that a 
                                                     
137 P. Varul, I. Kull et al (n 28) 651. 
138 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 21 December 2010 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-67-10 
where it is stated that disclosure of data about the debtor is, in itself, not contrary to good 
morals unless the aim of disclosure is to disgrace the debtor instead of collecting debts. 
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transaction is contrary to good morals. It is, however, implicit in this decision 
that according to the Supreme Court, cheating someone out of money as one 
form of disclosure of untrue statements may be handled as intentional behaviour 
contrary to good morals.139  
In German literature it has been attempted to formulate good morals through 
“persons with sense of common decency and fairness” (in German Anstands-
gefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden).140 It is understandable that resolu-
tion of a specific dispute based on this wide definition alone would be rather 
complicated. In order to do that, more precise criteria with which disclosure of 
false information should comply with should be defined. In the dissertation, the 
author seeks an answer to the question, when could the director be held liable 
for intentional disclosure of untrue statements. 
 
Statement set forth for defence 
The director is not held liable for intentional disclosure of every kind of false 
information. The precondition of the director’s tort liability for intentional 
disclosure of untrue statements is that the presented information has decisive 
meaning on the injured party making the decision to conclude the transaction 
and the injured party has also relied on that information. Presenting of false 
information that forms the basis of liability may lie in active issuing of 
information, but also in concealing information that is identifiably important to 
the injured party.  
The statement under question is based on the presumption that the director’s 
intent has been established. 
 
Reasoning 
As noted above, section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA provides a general basis for all 
intentional breaches that could be handled as behaviours contrary to good 
morals according to judicial practice. It is a kind of substitute provision for 
situations that are not regulated by a specific protection provision or any other 
basis for a claim, but where the breach is so severe that it would be extremely 
unfair to deny the injured party’s right of claim. Alternatively, section 1045 (1) 
8) of the LOA can also apply in situations where the law already provides a 
protection provision for the corresponding breach. For example, intentional 
causing of insolvency may be considered as being behaviour contrary to good 
morals141 although in such a situation the director may also be held liable on the 
basis of the protection provision that provides the duty to file the bankruptcy 
petition (section 180 (51) of the CC in co-effect with section 1045 (1) 7) of the 
LOA). However, it should be kept in mind that only the defendant’s negligence 
must be established to file a claim on the basis of section 180 (51) of the CC, but 
to file a claim on the basis of section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA, the plaintiff must 
                                                     
139 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2013 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-62-13. 
140 K. Rebmann, F. J. Säcker, R. Rixecker (n 34) 1898. 
141 L. Michalski, G. Dannecker et al (n 126) 533 et seq. 
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separately prove the intent of the defendant, which may be a very difficult thing 
to do in practice. 
If there is no corresponding protection provision or any other basis for a 
claim, the only option is to file the claim on the basis of section 1045 (1) 8) of 
the LOA. Intentional disclosure of untrue statements by the director is one of 
such cases.142 
The central question when filing a claim on the basis of section 1045 (1) 8) 
of the LOA, is whether the breach that the director is being blamed for is 
contrary to good morals. Due to legal dogmatic differences, out of the countries 
of comparison, section 1045 (1) 8) of the Estonian LOA can be directly com-
pared only to German law as German law provides a similar basis for a claim in 
section 826 of the BGB. In Germany, only such disclosure of untrue statements 
can be contrary to good morals that has a determinative importance on the 
injured party taking the risks s(he) would not have taken if s(he) had had a 
correct perception of the facts.143  
In English law, the concept ‘contrary to good morals’ is foreign; however, 
they recognise a quite similar concept ‘deceit’, which is an independent tort. For 
example, a director who intentionally disclosed untrue statements with the aim 
to receive a payment on the basis of a letter of credit has been held liable in 
English judicial practice.144 The plaintiff is required to prove that the disclosure 
of untrue statements had a significant influence on his/her decision.145 In Eng-
land, the director may be held liable for deceit for active misrepresentation; 
simply keeping quiet will usually not bring about liability of the director.146 
The concept that is similar to German and Estonian concept ‘contrary to 
good morals’ and English concept ‘deceit’ in Spanish law is ‘dolo grave’. It is 
considered important in Spain as well that the presented untrue statements 
                                                     
142 In Estonian law there is no general protection provision that would forbid the director to 
disclose untrue statements. However, it is possible that for certain special cases protection 
provisions do exist. In its judgement of 30 September 2010 in civil matter No. 2-07-7382 
Tallinn Circuit Court has contemplated the possibility that the provision that provides the 
duty to organise accounting is a protection provision provided for the protection of the 
interests of creditors. The author is, however, doubtful as to whether it is a protection 
provision since it is not the primary purpose of general obligation to keep records to offer 
protection to creditors. The same position that merely breach of the general obligation to 
keep records cannot bring about tort liability of the director to third persons that arises from 
breach of a protection provision has been taken in Germany as well. Rocco Jula, Der GmbH-
Geschäftsführer. 4th edn. (Springer 2012) 279.  
143 Maria Cristina Ciota, Die deliktische Aussenhaftung des Vorstandes einer Aktiengesell-
schaft (Aachen, Shaker Verlag 2008) 186 et seq. 
144 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, [2002] UKHL 43, 
[2003] 1 All ER 173. 
145 W.V.H.Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort. 17th edn. (London, Sweet&Maxwell 2006) 
480 et seq. 
146 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort 
Law. 5th edn. (New York, Oxford 2003) 502. 
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would have a determinative importance on the injured party’s decision to enter 
into the transaction.147 
Based on the above, a position can be taken that the countries of comparison 
have all thought it necessary that untrue statements should have decisive 
importance on the injured party’s decision to enter into the transaction for the 
director’s personal liability to arise. It can also be said in such a way that if the 
injured party had been aware of actual facts, s(he) would not have entered into 
the transaction at all or would have done so on significantly different terms. Of 
course causation has to have been established, i.e., the victim has to have relied 
on the presented untrue statements while entering into the transaction. There-
fore, just any kind of creative facts or other exaggerations that had no real 
influence on the decision of the injured party cannot form a basis for personal 
tort liability of the director.148 
The author thinks that there is no reason to distinguish between whether 
disclosure of untrue statements was the result of the director’s active or passive 
activity. Concealment of information that is of significant importance to the 
injured party is in no way a more minor breach than active submission of untrue 
statements. It is often just a matter of a “sales technique” whether to avoid 
giving an answer to the question that is of interest to the injured party, to only 
give a partial answer (so-called half-truth) or to lie when giving the answer. The 
real issue lies more in the fact that it is presumably more complicated for the 
plaintiff to prove intent in the case of passive disclosure of false information 
than in the case of active lying. Certification of the intent of the defendant is a 
complicated task in any case; however, in the case of active lying, intent can 
often be proved on the basis of facts, e.g., the director presented a false 
statement about fact A to the injured party during the conclusion of the contract 
while true circumstances about fact A had to have been known to the director 
for sure. However, passive presenting of untrue statements means that the 
director conceals the true circumstances about fact A during the conclusion of 
the contract, but does not present a false statement either. In such a situation it is 
far more complicated for the plaintiff to prove that the director intentionally 
concealed respective information. 
 
 
5.3.2. Liability for Negligent Disclosure of  
Untrue Statements or for Culpa in Contrahendo 
Description of the problem 
Certification of intent during the disclosure of untrue statements may often 
prove to be problematic and, therefore, the author analyses on which conditions 
                                                     
147 SAP Madrid 13150/2012, 11.07.2012. 
148 This certainly does not preclude company’s own potential liability for breach of the 
contract (e.g., if the sold goods do not comply with the terms and conditions provided in the 
contract). 
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the director could be held liable for disclosure of untrue statements in the case 
of negligence. 
If liability for the director’s negligence would be as severe as liability for 
intentional disclosure of untrue statements, it could extend the boundaries of the 
director’s liability too far – the director’s own role in presenting false infor-
mation would become secondary and his/her liability would depend more on 
how important is the particular information to the injured party.149 
In exceptional cases, however, personal liability of the director for negligent 
disclosure of untrue statements could be considered. Pursuant to sections 14 (1) 
and (2) of the Estonian LOA, persons who engage in pre-contractual negotia-
tions or other preparations for entering into a contract must take reasonable 
account of one another’s interests and rights. Information exchanged by the 
persons in the course of preparation for entering into the contract must be 
accurate. Persons who engage in pre-contractual negotiations or other prepa-
rations for entering into a contract must inform the other party of all 
circumstances with regard to which the other party has, based on the purpose of 
the contract, an identifiable essential interest (culpa in contrahendo, hereinafter 
c.i.c.). Section 14 of the LOA does not preclude personal liability of the 
representative of the party (director) on the basis of c.i.c. either.  
 
Statement set forth for defence 
Liability of the director as a representative of the company for damage caused 
to the creditor with negligent disclosure of untrue statements is possible only if 
special reliance has been created between the injured party and the director 
enabling the injured party to believe groundedly that the director has assumed 
personal liability for the correctness of presented information.  
Merely the director’s personal economic interest in the company does not 
form a basis for his/her personal liability. Depending on the circumstance, 
liability of the director for negligent disclosure of untrue statements may be 
affirmed in certain cases if the transaction has formally been entered into in the 
name of the company; however, in the economic sense, the transaction is only 
related to the director’s private interests (acting on the principle of procurator 
in rem suam). 
 
Reasoning 
Obligations and liability arising from pre-contractual negotiations primarily 
apply to the negotiating party (the company). This is supported by section 31 
                                                     
149 E.g., the director of a company that is the contractor discloses information that is based 
on information presented by the subcontractor to the customer. Later becomes clear that this 
information was not true and had determinative importance on injured party’s decision to 
enter into the transaction. If it would be possible to hold the director liable for disclosure of 
untrue statements merely due to negligence, the possibility of personal tort liability of the 
director could arise in the current example since the director might have been negligent in 
verifying the information presented by the subcontractor. 
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(5) of the GPCCA pursuant to which, the activities of an organ of a company 
are deemed to be the activities of the company.  
Nevertheless, section 14 of the LOA does not exclude the possibility that 
obligations and liability are also extended to the representative of the party. In 
Estonian legal literature, the position has been taken so far that the 
representative of the party may also be held liable for breach of the obligations 
provided in section 14 of the LOA if s(he) has caused the other party to feel 
justified reliance towards him/her as a potential party to the contract.150 
On 5 June 2013, the Estonian Supreme Court rendered a fundamental 
decision in which it covered the possibility of personal liability of the director 
as a legal representative of the company on the basis of section 14 of the 
LOA.151 The Supreme Court found that obligations arising from section 14 of 
the LOA do not extend only to the parties to the negotiations, but also to their 
representatives. According to the Court, the director may have breached the 
requirements of section 14 of the LOA if he has not informed the buyer about 
the impossibility of performing the contract of sale during the conclusion of the 
contract. The liability of the representative of the party for breach of the 
requirements of section 14 of the LOA is, however, not based on section 115 of 
the LOA, but on section 1043 and section 1045 (1) 7) of the LOA, i.e., at least 
should be more lenient. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, sections 14 (1) 
and (2) of the LOA are protection provisions for the purposes of section 1045 
(1) 7) of the LOA. Pursuant to section 1045 (3) of the LOA, the plaintiff’s 
damage should be included in the protection purpose of sections 14 (1) or (2) of 
the LOA. According to the Supreme Court, the liability of the representative 
primarily arises, “When the other party has special reliance towards a specific 
person who was engaged in negotiations, e.g., deriving from his official position 
in the company that takes part of the negotiations, or if his economic interests 
are the same as the company’s economic interests.” However, unfortunately the 
Supreme Court has not presented more precise criteria on how to give meaning 
to the referred reliance and economic interests. 
The c.i.c. principle has originally been developed by German lawyer Rudolf 
von Ihering in an article published in 1861.152 Liability of the director as a 
representative of the party on the basis of c.i.c. has been considered possible in 
                                                     
150 P. Varul, I. Kull et al (n 55) 64. 
151 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2013 in civil matter No. 3-2-1-62-13. 
According to the facts of the case, the director concluded a contract of sale with AS DNB 
Pank in the name of OÜ Staford. On the same day that same director concluded a leasing 
contract with AS DNB Pank concerning the same equipment in the name of AS Hotronic. 
Two years later the bank cancelled the leasing contract, but disposal of equipment turned out 
to be impossible since the same equipment had been transferred to a third person (Riigi 
Kinnisvara AS) before they were sold to the bank. The director had to have been aware that 
the seller had no right of disposal with regard to the assets, but he did not notify the bank 
about it. 
152 Rudolf von Ihering, Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur 
perfektion gelangten Vertragen, in Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und 
deutschen Privatrechts (4/1861) 1–112. 
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Germany on two occasions: if a special reliance has been created between the 
party and the director, or if the director has had personal economic interest in 
the transaction. 
According to prevailing opinion in Germany special reliance must clearly go 
beyond the scope of common trust.153 The fact that the director personally takes 
part in the negotiations is not enough; also, merely the existence of long-term 
business relationships does not form a basis for the creation of special 
reliance.154 An example of special reliance would be a case where the director 
persuades the other party to conclude a contract based on existing close blood 
relationships between them.155 A grounded impression must have been created 
in the other party that the director himself/herself will personally guarantee the 
performance of the contract.156 
In earlier German judicial practice has been the position expressed that for 
the c.i.c. liability of the director is enough if the director is a shareholder of the 
company.157 However, the BGH has later found that merely the fact that the 
director is a (sole) shareholder of the company does not cause the director to be 
personally economically interested in the particular transaction;158 also, it is not 
grounded to attribute personal economic interest to the director if s(he) has 
given a personal surety or real collateral to secure an obligation of the com-
pany.159 Personal economic interest of the director has been considered possible 
if the director has acted on the principle of procurator in rem suam when 
entering into a transaction; however, the latter group of cases has been called 
into question as well since merely the director’s personal interest in the 
transaction should not make the other party expect that the number of persons 
liable for the performance of the contract has increased.160  
In English law, the c.i.c. principle is not explicitly known; however, they 
have a principle with quite a similar effect called ‘negligent misrepresentation’, 
which has been recognised in English judicial practice as a separate tort. Two 
main cases have played a key part in the development of the tort in question: 
Hedley Byrne161 and Williams v Natural Life Health Foods.162 Based on these 
decisions, it may be concluded that the director can be held liable on the basis 
of negligent misrepresentation if, similarly to German c.i.c. liability, a special 
relationship has been created between the director and the other party to the 
transaction and the director has assumed responsibility. It is not visible from the 
                                                     
153 I. Drescher (n 29) 179. 
154 BGH 1.7.1991, WM 1991, p 1548, 1549; M. Lutter, P. Hommelhoff et al (n 126) 1163. 
155 BGH 23.2.1983, BGHZ 87, p 27, 32. 
156 M. Lutter, P. Hommelhoff et al (n 126) 1164. 
157 BGH 19.12.1962, WM 1963, p 160, 161. 
158 BGH 23.10.1985, NJW 1986, p 586, 587; BGH 27.3.1995, NJW 1995, 1544. 
159 BGH 6.6.1994, BGHZ 126; BGH 13.6.2002, ZIP 2002, 1771. 
160 Frank Eckhoff, Die Haftung der Geschäftsleiter gegenüber den Gläubigern der Gesell-
schaft wegen Insolvenzverschleppung (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2010) 102, 109. 
161 Hedley Byrne and Co v Heller and Partners [1963] 2 All ER 575 (HL). 
162 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods [1998] 2 All ER 577. 
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approach to negligent misrepresentation that personal economic interest of the 
director could form a basis for the director’s personal tort liability based on the 
principle in question. 
C.i.c. liability is not known in Spanish Codigo Civil either; however, 
references to it have been made in the judicial practice.163 For Spanish tort law 
is characteristic a laconic regulation164 and for that reason, judicial practice has 
played a major role in the development of tort law. Since there is no separate 
basis for a claim for c.i.c. in Spanish Codigo Civil, corresponding cases have 
been resolved on the basis of general tort liability.165 Therefore, c.i.c. liability 
has been considered as quintessentially tortious.166 Unlike German and English 
law, Spanish courts do not seem to find it necessary that special reliance or 
personal economic interest would be established; however, this does not mean 
that the director’s liability on the basis of c.i.c. would be limitless in Spain. If a 
creditor wishes to file a compensatory claim directly against the director, it is 
important to bear in mind section 241 of the TRLSC, which enables a third 
person to file an action against the director only if the director has directly 
damaged the creditor with his/her unlawful act and not reflectively through a 
decrease in the company’s assets.167 In Spanish law, this has been interpreted in 
such a way that in the case of potential direct liability of the director, existence 
of causation must be checked significantly more closely in order to rule out the 
possibility of holding the director solidarily liable for all obligations of the 
company.168 
Based on the above comparative analysis, the author takes the position that 
liability of the director for negligent disclosure of untrue statements (or for 
c.i.c.) cannot be equal to the liability of the negotiating party (company). Since 
only the existence of negligence is needed, liability of the director would 
become unreasonably severe if the director and the company would be 
solidarily liable in every case of negligent disclosure of untrue statements.169  
The director may be held liable for negligent disclosure of untrue statements 
primarily if special reliance has been created between the director and the other 
party to the transaction. Giving exact meaning to this special reliance will be in 
the discretion of the courts in every separate case; however, there is reason to 
point out as the main criterion that in no case can special reliance be equal to 
the reliance applied in usual economic circulation. It is natural that all 
                                                     
163 STS 3068/2013, 6.5.2013; STS 6635/2011, 15.10.2011. 
164 Spanish Civil Code is based on French Code Napoléon (Code Civil des Français 1804). 
There are only nine sections on tort law in Spanish Civil Code; some of those sections are 
rather archaic – for example, section 1910 of the Civil Code, which stipulates the liability of 
the head of household for damage caused from falling objects from the house where he is 
living in. 
165 Section 1902 of the Codigo Civil. 
166 STS 9982/1988, 16.5.1988. 
167 SAP Salamanca 339/2013, 3.6.2013. 
168 STS 14024/1992, 21.5.1992. 
169 C.i.c. liability is, in principle, also possible in the case of intent; however, in that case, 
filing a claim on the basis of section 1045 (1) 8) of the LOA should be considered instead. 
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contractual relationships are, to some extent, based on reliance. Thus, merely 
having a long-term business relationship is not enough for the creation of 
special reliance since in that case, the director would be held liable with regard 
to long-term business partners to the same extent as the company. There is 
reason to talk about special reliance if a party groundedly feels significantly 
more reliance towards the director than to other persons during the conclusion 
of similar transactions.  
The author is of the opinion that personal economic interest should, in 
general, not be a basis of the director’s liability for negligent disclosure of 
untrue statements. The author agrees with German judicial practice according to 
which, the mere fact that the director is a shareholder of the company should not 
give rise to the director’s liability on the basis of c.i.c. The author finds that this 
would be contrary to the principle of limited liability of the company since the 
fact of being a shareholder would cause the director to be additionally liable for 
the obligations of the company whilst liability of the shareholder is limited to 
his/her equity in the company. Likewise, liability of the director should not 
increase simply because s(he) has granted a loan to the company, provided 
surety to the company’s obligations, etc. which may cause him/her to be more 
interested in the transaction that is being entered into in the name of the 
company. Clearly there is reason to claim that, to some extent, the director 
always has a personal economic interest in how the company is doing (even if 
just for the reason that the director’s remuneration may depend on it); however, 
that in itself should not form a basis for the director’s liability on the basis of 
c.i.c. since the result may be that the director’s liability on the basis of c.i.c. will 
become equal to the liability of the company. The author considers it possible to 
hold the director liable for negligent disclosure of untrue statements due to 
personal economic interest only in exceptional cases if the director has entered 
into a transaction in the name of the company, but in the economic sense the 
transaction is only related to the director’s own private interests (procurator in 
rem suam). As a supplementary condition, the other party to the transaction 
should also be aware that the transaction is related to the director’s personal 
interests. If the other party to the transaction does not know anything about the 
director’s personal interests, s(he) has no reason to assume while entering into 
the transaction that in addition to the company someone else will also be liable 
for the performance of the transaction. In the opinion of the author, the director 
could be held personally liable, for example, when the transaction is indeed 
entered into in the name of the company, but both parties are aware and equally 
understand that performance of the transaction takes place only in the private 
interests of the director.170 Quintessentially, this situation is similar to the 
above-mentioned special reliance – the other party to the transaction 
                                                     
170 E.g., the director concludes a contract for services in the name of the company for repair 
works to be done in the director’s personal apartment. There is no connection between the 
company and the apartment and the other party to the transaction understands that although 
the company should formally pay for the works, they are only carried out in the private 
interests of the director. 
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understands that the performance of the contract will actually take place in the 
private interests of the director and, therefore, the party may feel justified 
reliance that if needed, the director is willing to assume personal responsibility 
for the performance of the transaction.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
A company as a legal entity bears all its legal liabilities and its creditors may 
demand the satisfaction of their claims directly from the company. However, in 
certain circumstances the creditors may turn their claims also towards directors. 
The aim of current dissertation has been to find a reasonable balance between 
the creditors’ interests and directors’ tort liability.  
The author has found that with regard to breach of the duty to file the 
bankruptcy petition, the enforcement of quota loss claims should be easier for 
old creditors. Due to high burden of proof the enforcement of old creditors’ 
compensatory claims is too complicated, which is proved by the shortage of 
respective judicial practice. For that reason, in the case of company’s 
bankruptcy, interests of old creditors are protected only to a small extent and the 
director may feel tempted to abuse his/her position since the probability of 
being held personally liable is very low. Filing of corresponding claims is 
especially difficult in the case of unsatisfactory organising of company’s 
accounting. Therefore, the author proposes to give more discretion to courts in 
ordering quota loss in cases where the director has breached the obligation to 
keep records. As an alternative, the author proposes to reverse the burden of 
proof to the prejudice of the director who breached the obligation to keep 
records. Since correct accounting is in the power of the director, the director is 
able to regulate his/her own liability by keeping the company’s accounting in 
order. Therefore, if the proposals of the author would be put into practice, 
liability of the director would remain within reasonable boundaries; however, at 
the same time, protection of creditors would be improved. 
The author is of the opinion that with regard to the liability of the director 
who has breached the duty to file the bankruptcy petition a clear distinction 
should be made between old and new creditors. The duty of the director to file a 
bankruptcy petition in due time has two objectives: first, to avoid further 
decrease in the assets of an insolvent company (protection of old creditors) and 
second, to prohibit conclusion of new contractual relationships with an 
insolvent company (protection of new creditors). Making a distinction between 
old and new creditors is important because it can enable new creditors to 
enforce their reliance loss claims in court much more easily compared to the 
enforcement of old creditors’ quota loss claims (no need to prove loss of quota). 
The fact that enforcement of reliance loss claims is far more widespread in 
practice than enforcement of quota loss claims is also confirmed by German 
judicial practice. Recognition of new creditors’ reliance loss claims enables 
better protection of the interests of creditors since it makes successful enforce-
ment of compensatory claims against the director more probable (at least with 
respect to reliance loss). At the same time, recognition of new creditors’ 
reliance loss claims does not make liability of the director unreasonably severe. 
Breach of the duty to file the bankruptcy petition, which forms the basis of 
liability, is clearly in the director’s own power. The director is also the one who 
can decide whether to conclude new contracts in the name of an insolvent 
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company or not. It is very easy for the director to avoid causing damage to new 
creditors and, therefore, be released from liability if s(he) files the bankruptcy 
petition of an insolvent company on time or at least refrains from concluding 
new contracts in the name of the insolvent company. 
The author concludes that it should be possible to held a director personally 
liable for causing damage to the creditors not only in the insolvency of a com-
pany, but already in a so-called twilight zone when the company is still solvent 
but thinly capitalised. The author thinks that thin capitalisation of the company 
is a clear sign of danger that should not be taken lightly. If thin capitalisation of 
the company can be overcome, no negative consequences will arise. However, 
if thin capitalisation deepens into permanent insolvency then, in the opinion of 
the author, in such a situation law should enable better protection of the 
interests of creditors. The author’s proposition for implementation of an 
additional protection provision would impose a duty on the director to terminate 
the activities of a company that is in the state of thin capitalisation if the 
shareholders of the company are not willing to take extra risks by investing 
additional capital into the company or by applying other measures. The author 
is of the opinion that the proposed solution would not make liability of the 
director unreasonably severe since it is in the power of the director to decide 
whether to file the dissolution petition of the company or not and (s)he 
her/himself can influence that decision. Quite a long period would precede the 
filing of the dissolution petition, which would give enough time for the director 
to consider possibilities for reorganisation, conduct negotiations with share-
holders and creditors, and apply appropriate measures. Within that time period, 
the director can take a well-considered decision to either file the dissolution 
petition of the company or continue the activities of the company if s(he) is 
convinced that thin capitalisation is temporary and poses no threat to the 
solvency of the company. 
In the last set of statements set forth for defence in this dissertation, the 
author has covered liability of the director for disclosure of untrue statements. 
The author has come to the conclusion that neither every kind of disclosure of 
untrue statements nor every form of fault can form a basis for the director’s 
liability. Intentional disclosure of untrue statements contrary to good morals can 
form a basis for the director’s tort liability. In order to file such a compensatory 
claim against the director, the injured party is required to prove intent of the 
director in addition to other necessary elements of tort. This places a high 
burden of proof on the injured party; however, at the same time, the condition 
of intent enables to keep the director’s liability within reasonable boundaries to 
avoid a flood of claims for every negligent checking or presenting of 
information by the director. The central question is what kind of disclosure of 
untrue statements could be considered as being contrary to good morals. A 
conclusion has been reached in the dissertation that intentional disclosure of 
untrue statements (including concealment of information) can be contrary to 
good morals if that information had a determinative importance on the injured 
party’s decision to enter into the transaction. The author finds that protection of 
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creditors in the above-mentioned situation is grounded and the possibility of 
filing a tortious compensatory claim against the director should be affirmed. 
The director, in turn, is able to regulate his/her liability by not lying intentio-
nally. 
In certain cases, the director may be held liable for negligent disclosure of 
untrue statements on the basis of c.i.c., whereby in such cases negligence of the 
director is enough for liability to arise. However, liability of the director on the 
basis of c.i.c. can arise in very exceptional circumstances; primarily if special 
reliance that is clearly beyond the usual reliance common in economic 
transactions has been created between the director and the other negotiating 
party. In addition, depending on the circumstances, the director can also be held 
liable for negligent disclosure of untrue statements if s(he) has entered into the 
transaction in the name of the company, but in the economic sense, the 
transaction is only related to the director’s own private interests and the other 
party is aware of that. Although c.i.c. liability of the director can be applied 
merely in the case of the director’s negligence, it does not unreasonably extend 
the boundaries of the director’s liability since cases where the director’s liability 
on the basis of c.i.c. could at all be applied are very exceptional. Despite the fact 
that c.i.c. liability of the director may be of marginal importance from the point 
of view of the protection of creditors, recognition of this form of liability is, in 
the opinion of the author, important as it enables to offer protection to creditors 
from abuse of special reliance. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Juhatuse liikme deliktiline vastutus äriühingu võlausaldajate ees 
Käesolevas väitekirjas käsitletakse äriühingu juhatuse liikme deliktilist vastutust 
äriühingu võlausaldajate ees. Äriühingu all on silmas peetud piiratud vastu-
tusega kapitaliühinguid, eelkõige osaühinguid ja aktsiaseltse, mis on enam-
levinud äriühingute liigid. Juhatuse liige on äriühingu seaduslik esindaja, kes 
juhib ühingut ja korraldab selle igapäevast majandustegevust.  
Väitekiri põhineb autori poolt avaldatud neljal õigusteaduslikul artiklil: 
 
1. “Limitation of Personal Tort Liability of a Member of the Management 
Board of a Company – Perspective of Estonia”.172 Nimetatud artiklis on 
analüüsitud peamisi juhatuse liikme deliktilise vastutuse juhtumeid ühingu 
võlausaldajate ees: kaitsenormi rikkumisest tulenev vastutus (s.h pankroti-
avalduse esitamisega viivitamisest tulenev vastutus), valeinfo avaldamisest 
ja tahtlikust heade kommete vastasest käitumisest tulenev vastutus. 
2. “Personal Liability of a Director in the Insolvency of a Company”.173 Viida-
tud artiklis on analüüsitud juhatuse liikme vastutust ühingu maksejõuetuse 
olukorras pankrotiavalduse esitamisega viivitamisel. 
3. “Personal Liability of a Director to Creditors in Case of Thin Capitalisation 
of a Company”.174 Nimetatud artiklis on esitatud analüüs juhatuse liikme 
deliktilise vastutuse võimalikkuse kohta ühingu alakapitaliseerituse olu-
korras. 
4. “The Company Director’s Liability for Untrue Statements”.175 Kõnesolevas 
artiklis on autor analüüsinud juhatuse liikme vastutust võlausaldajate ees 
valeinfo avaldamisel. Artiklis on eraldi uuritud juhatuse liikme vastutuse 
võimalikkust valeinfo tahtlikul ja hooletul avaldamisel. 
 
Reeglina juhatuse liige vastutab vaid sisesuhtes äriühingu ees, mille juhatuse 
liige ta on. Isiku valimisel juhatuse liikmeks tekib tema ja ühingu vahel lepin-
guline suhe, mis olemuslikult vastab enim käsunduslepingule. Sisesuhte all ongi 
silmas peetud juhatuse liikme ja ühingu vahelist õigussuhet. Seevastu välis-
suhtes äriühingu võlausaldajate ees vastutab üldjuhul vaid äriühing ise. Siiski on 
teatud juhtudel võimalik ka juhatuse liikme deliktiline vastutus äriühingu võla-
usaldajate ees.  
Väitekirja eesmärgiks on selgitada välja juhatuse liikme deliktilise vastutuse 
mõistlikud piirid, mis ühelt poolt kaitseks piisaval määral võlausaldajate huve, 
teisalt aga ei pärsiks liigse ranguse tõttu juhatuse liikme ettevõtlusvaimu.  
Töö eesmärgi saavutamiseks on autor uurinud alljärgnevaid uurimis-
küsimusi:  
                                                     
172 European Business Law Review (Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2013) 243–259.  
173 International Insolvency Law Review (Vol. 4, Issue 3, 2013) 268–284. 
174 Juridica International (Vol 21, 2014) 168–175. 
175 Baltic Journal of Law and Politics (Vol 7, Issue 1, 2014) 70–96. 
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 Kas on põhjendatud lihtsustada vana võlausaldaja tõendamiskoormist 
kvoodikahju nõuete maksmapanekul juhatuse liikme vastu, kes on rikkunud 
pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustust? 
 Kas pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustuse kaitse eesmärgiks peaks olema 
lisaks vana võlausaldaja kvoodikahjule ka uue võlausaldaja usalduskahju 
hüvitamine? 
 Kas ja millistel tingimustel on põhjendatud juhatuse liikme deliktiline vastu-
tus võlausaldajate ees, kui juhatuse liige on jäänud äriühingu alakapitali-
seerituse olukorras tegevusetuks? 
 Kas ja millistel tingimustel on põhjendatud juhatuse liikme deliktiline 
vastutus võlausaldajate ees, kui juhatuse liige on tekitanud kahju tahtliku 
valeinfo esitamisega? 
 Kas ja millistel tingimustel on põhjendatud juhatuse liikme otsevastutus 
äriühingu võlausaldaja ees hooletul valeinfo esitamisel? 
 
Autor on kasutanud väitekirjas peamiselt võrdlevat meetodit (kasutatud meto-
doloogia kohta vt täpsemalt väitekirja p 4) ning analüüsinud uurimisküsimusi 
võrrelduna Eesti, Saksa, Inglise ja Hispaania õiguses. Nõnda on autori analüüsis 
esindatud Anglo-Ameerika, Germaani ning Romaani, ehk Euroopa suurimad 
õigusperekonnad. Eesti õiguse on autor valinud võrdlusobjektiks kui oma 
koduriigi õiguse. Võrreldes teiste võrdlusriikidega on Eesti teinud läbi suhte-
liselt hiljutise põhjaliku õigusliku transformatsiooni, mistõttu Eesti õigust on 
seni uuritud ja arendatud võrdlusriikidest kõige vähem. Uurimisküsimuste püsti-
tamisel ja analüüsimisel on autor lähtunud esmajoones Eesti õigusest. Samas 
autori eesmärgiks on olnud leida lahendused, mis on universaalsed ja võiks 
põhimõtteliselt olla aktuaalsed kõigis võrdlusriikides. Loomulikult tuleb autori 
väidete kohandamisel eri võrdlusriikidele arvestada õigusdogmaatilisi ja 
materiaalõiguslikke erisusi (nii ei ole näiteks Inglise õiguses tuntud culpa in 
contrahendo põhimõte, kuid väitekirja viimases uurimisküsimuses esitatud 
põhiseisukohad võiks olla põhimõtteliselt huvipakkuvad ka Inglise õiguses 
vastava delikti – negligent misrepresentation – raames).  
Väitekirjas uuritakse üksnes juhatuse liikme deliktilist vastutust ühingu 
võlausaldajate ees. Väitekirja raames ei ole uuritud teiste, juhatuse liikmega 
sarnases positsioonis olevate isikute vastutust (nõukogu liige, pankrotihaldur, 
likvideerija, prokurist, samuti de facto juhatuse liige, kes olemata õiguslikult 
juhatuse liige, siiski täidab faktiliselt juhatuse liikme rolli).  
Väitekirjas ei ole uuritud juhatuse liikme sisesuhtel põhinevat vastutust 
ühingu enda ees. Samuti jääb väitekirja raamest välja juhatuse liikme võimalik 
vastutus ühingu osanike/aktsionäride ees (v.a juhul kui osanik/aktsionär on 
samal ajal käsitletav ühingu võlausaldajana). Väitekirja mahust jäävad välja ka 
juhatuse liikme maksuõiguslik ja karistusõiguslik vastutus. 
Juhatuse liikme deliktiõigusliku vastutuse uurimisel on autor piirdunud 
küsimustega, kus on põhjust rääkida seosest juhatuse liikme tegevuse spetsii-
fikaga (nt kaitsenormi rikkumine pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustuse rikku-
mise näitel, mis on omane eelkõige juhatuse liikmele). Väitekirja raamest on 
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välja jäetud võimalikud deliktilise vastutuse juhtumid, millel pole juhatuse 
liikmeks olemisega iseenesest mingit spetsiifilist seost (nt kui juhatuse liige 
tekitab teisele isikule tervisekahjustuse). Väitekirja raamest jäävad välja ka 
üldiste käibekohustuste rikkumise juhtumid. 
Alljärgnevalt esitab autor kokkuvõtte töös esitatud väidetest ja nende 
põhjendustest.  
 
 
I Vanade võlausaldajate kvoodikahju hüvitamine 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Vana võlausaldaja kvoodikahju nõude maksmapanekul on hageja tõendamis-
koormis liiga kõrge ning selle leevendamiseks tuleks kaaluda kohtutele suurema 
diskretsiooni andmist või tõendamiskoormise ümberpööramist. 
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Vastavalt Eestis kehtiva äriseadustiku (ÄS) § 180 lg-le 51 on juhatuse liikmel 
kohustus viivitamata, kuid mitte hiljem kui 20 päeva jooksul osaühingu püsiva 
maksejõuetuse ilmnemisest esitada kohtule pankrotiavaldus. Kohtupraktikas on 
vastav norm tunnistatud võlausaldajaid kaitsvaks kaitsenormiks võlaõigus-
seaduse (VÕS) § 1045 lg 1 p 7 mõistes, mis võimaldab võlausaldajal esitada 
normis sätestatud kohustust rikkunud juhatuse liikme vastu deliktiline kahju-
nõue. 
Kui juhatuse liige rikub pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustust, on vanal 
võlausaldajal (s.o võlausaldajal, kelle nõue oli olemas maksejõuetuse tekkimise 
hetkel) õigus esitada juhatuse liikme vastu nõue kvoodikahju hüvitamiseks, 
mille suuruse arvutamiseks tuleb diferentsihüpoteesi põhjal välja selgitada, kui 
suures summas oleks õnnestunud vastava võlausaldaja nõuet rahuldada 
pankrotiavalduse õigeaegsel esitamisel, ning võrrelda seda tegelikult hüvita-
misele kuuluva summaga. 
Kvoodikahju arvutamise aluseks oleva nõude rahuldamise hüpoteetilise 
ulatuse hindamiseks on vaja välja selgitada kaks peamist asjaolu: millal tekkis 
ühingu püsiv maksejõuetus (sellest sõltub juhatuse liikme pankrotiavalduse 
kohustuse tekkimise hetk) ja milline oli ühingu varade ja kohustuste täpne maht 
pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustuse tekkimise hetkel (sellest sõltub võla-
usaldaja nõude hüpoteetilise rahuldamise ulatus). 
Kui ühingu raamatupidamist on korraldatud ebarahuldavalt, on eelnimetatud 
asjaolusid väga keeruline tõendada. See võib tekitada praktikas vastuolulise 
olukorra, kui juhatuse liikme üks rikkumine (aruandluskohustus) võib tõenda-
matuse tõttu vabastada vastutusest teise rikkumise (pankrotiavalduse esitamise 
kohustus) eest. 
Kehtivas Eesti õiguses võimaldavad kohtute suurema diskretsiooni raken-
damist VÕS § 127 lg 6 ja tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustiku (TsMS) § 233, kuid 
autorile teadaolevalt ei ole Eesti kohtud vana võlausaldaja kvoodikahju vaid-
lustes viidatud sätteid seni rakendanud ning kvoodikahju tõendamatuse korral 
on vastavad võlausaldajate hagid juhatuse liikme vastu jäetud rahuldamata. See 
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loob ebaõiglase olukorra, kus ka suuremate kuritarvituste puhul pole võimalik 
juhatuse liiget tsiviilõiguslikult vastutusele võtta, kui ta on eelnevalt raamatu-
pidamisdokumendid hävitanud või jätnud raamatupidamise üldse korraldamata.  
Statistika kohaselt lõpeb Eestis 58% pankrotiasjadest raugemisega pankrotti 
välja kuulutamata. Sellele lisandub veel 6% juhtudest, kui menetlus lõpeb 
raugemisega peale pankroti väljakuulutamist. Raugemisega lõppenud menet-
lustes ei saanud võlausaldajad oma nõuetele ühegi euro ulatuses rahuldust. 
Samas on Eesti kohtud rahuldanud autorile teadaolevalt perioodil 2012 – 2013.a 
vaid ühe võlausaldaja hagi juhatuse liikme vastu kvoodikahju hüvitamise 
nõudes. Eeltoodud arvude võrdlus annab tunnustust sellest, et võlausaldajate 
võimetus oma deliktilisi nõudeid juhatuse liikme vastu kohtulikult maksma 
panna on majanduskäibes ulatuslik probleem. 
Võrdlusriikidest Saksamaal on juhatuse liikme vastutus vanade võla-
usaldajate kvoodikahju nõuete eest reguleeritud põhimõtteliselt sarnaselt (InsO 
§ 15a lg 1, BGB § 823 lg 2), peamise erisusega, et võlausaldajate asemel on 
vastava nõude esitamiseks õigustatud pankrotihaldur. See erisus omab siiski 
vaid menetlusõiguslikku tähendust. Saksa õiguskirjanduse ja kohtupraktika 
analüüsi käigus on autor jõudnud seisukohale, et ka Saksamaal on tõenduslikud 
probleemid vanade võlausaldajate nõuete maksmapanekul probleemiks ja 
pelgalt võlausaldajate nõuete esitamine halduri vahendusel ei pruugi tagada 
vanade võlausaldajate paremat kaitset. 
Inglise kohtutel on suurem diskretsioon võlausaldajate kahjunõude kindlaks-
määramisel (IA 1986 art 214), kuid vastavate nõuete maksmapanekul tekitab 
probleeme suurem keerukus juhatuse liikme vastutuse algmomendi kindlaks-
tegemisel – erinevalt Eesti ja Saksa õigusest ei ole Inglise õiguses juhatuse 
liikme vastutuse algmomendi seisukohast määrav ühingu püsiva maksejõuetuse 
tekkimise hetk, vaid hoopis see, kas juhatuse liige pidi ette nägema ühingu 
pankrotimenetluslikke tagajärgi (insolvent liquidation). 
Hispaania õiguse regulatsioon annab kohtutele samuti suurema diskretsiooni 
võlausaldajate nõuete kindlaksmääramisel (LC § 172bis lg 1) ning sarnaselt 
Eesti ja Saksa õigusega on ka Hispaania õiguses juhatuse liikme vastutuse 
algmoment seotud ühingu püsiva maksejõuetuse objektiivse tekkimisega. Küll 
on Hispaanias juhatuse liikmel oluliselt rohkem aega pankrotiavalduse esita-
miseks (kui Eestis ja Saksamaal on pankrotiavalduse esitamise maksimaalne 
tähtaeg vastavalt 20 ja 21 päeva püsiva maksejõuetuse tekkimisest, siis His-
paanias on vastav tähtaeg 2 kuud). 
Kõigis võrdlusriikides on juhatuse liikme vastutus vanade võlausaldajate 
kvoodikahju nõuete eest põhimõtteliselt võimalik, kuid probleemiks on hageja 
võimetus nõude aluseks olevate asjaolude tõendamisel. Kvoodikahju vaidlustes 
peab hageja esitama tõendid asjaolude kohta, mis on täielikult juhatuse liikme 
(s.o kostja) mõjusfääris ja millega juhatuse liikmel on väga lihtne enda huvides 
manipuleerida. Seetõttu tekib makseraskustesse sattunud ühingu juhatuse 
liikmel sageli ahvatlus rikkuda raamatupidamise korraldamise kohustust, 
muutes seeläbi enda tsiviilõiguslikule vastutusele võtmiseks väga keeruliseks 
kui mitte võimatuks.  
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Autori arvates on põhjendatud kergendada vana võlausaldaja tõendamis-
koormist ning pakub selleks välja kaks alternatiivset võimalust.  
Esiteks peaks kohtutel olema kvoodikahju määratlemisel suurem diskret-
sioon. Nagu ülal märgitud, kui ühingu aruandlust on peetud korrektselt, on 
kvoodikahju suuruse tõendamine tõenäoline. Kui aga aruandlus puudub, on 
kvoodikahju tõendamine praktiliselt võimatu. Seetõttu võiks kohtud võtta aru-
andluskohustuse rikkumist arvesse täiendava asjaoluna, mis võimaldaks kohtul 
lähtudes oma siseveendumusest määrata kahjuhüvitis omal äranägemisel.  
Eesti näitel võiks kohtute diskretsiooni suurendamiseks kaaluda TsMS § 233 
lg 1 täiendamist alljärgnevalt (kehtivale redaktsioonile lisanduv tekst alla 
joonitud):  
 
Kui menetluses on tuvastatud kahju tekitamine, kuid kahju täpset suurust ei 
õnnestu kindlaks teha või selle kindlakstegemine on raskendatud rikkuja poolt 
seaduses sätestatud info esitamise, aruandluskohustuse või muu kaasaaitamis-
kohustuse rikkumise tõttu või see oleks seotud eriliste raskustega või eba-
mõistlikult suurte kuludega, muu hulgas kui tegemist on mittevaralise kahjuga, 
otsustab kohus kahju suuruse oma siseveendumuse kohaselt kõiki asjaolusid 
arvestades. 
 
Teiseks võib kaaluda tõendamiskoormise ümberpööramist. Kvoodikahju nõuete 
puhul võiks kaaluda tõendamiskoormise ümberpööramist selliselt, et kui on 
tõenäoline, et kostja on rikkunud pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustust ning 
sellega võis kaasneda võlausaldajatele kahju, kuid nende asjaolude tõendamine 
on kostja enda aruandluskohustuse rikkumise tõttu oluliselt raskendatud, 
eeldatakse kostja poolt pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustuse rikkumisega kahju 
tekitamist pankrotivara defitsiidi ulatuses. Kostja omakorda võib tõendada, et 
pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustust pole rikutud või et selle rikkumisega pole 
kahju tekitatud.  
Mõlemal juhul, nii kohtute diskretsiooni suurendamisel kui tõendamis-
koormise ümberpööramisel seondub juhatuse liikme võimalik deliktiline 
vastutus tema poolt aruandluskohustuse rikkumisega. See on juhatuse liikme 
enda mõjusfääris olev asjaolu, mida tal on lihtne mõjutada – juhatuse liige saab 
maandada oma vastutusega seotud riske, kui ta lihtsalt täidab aruandluskohus-
tust korrektselt. Kui ka aruandluskohustust on rikutud, kuid juhatuse liige pole 
kahju tekitanud, on tal jätkuvalt võimalus tõendada, et kahju pole tekkinud. 
 
 
II Uute võlausaldajate usalduskahju hüvitamine 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Kohtud peaks pankrotiavalduse esitamise kohustust rikkunud juhatuse liikme 
vastutuse kontekstis selgelt eristama vanu ja uusi võlausaldajaid. Erinevalt 
vanade võlausaldajate kvoodikahjust kuulub uute võlausaldajate puhul hüvi-
tamisele nendele tekitatud usalduskahju. 
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Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Kuigi Eesti Riigikohus tunnistas ÄS § 180 lg 51 ühingu võlausaldajaid kaitsvaks 
kaitsenormiks juba oma 06.05.2003.a otsuses, puudus Eesti kohtupraktikas 
pikka aega põhjalikum analüüs ÄS § 180 lg 51 kaitse eesmärgist, s.t millise 
kahju tekkimise eest vastav norm peaks võlausaldajaid kaitsma. Riigikohus tegi 
alles 25.02.2013.a lahendi, milles esmakordselt eristas selgelt ÄS § 180 lg 51 
kahesugust kaitse eesmärki: pankrotiavalduse esitamine peab ära hoidma 
maksejõuetu äriühingu varamassi edasise vähenemise, kuid lisaks peab see ära 
hoidma ka maksejõuetu äriühingu edasises majandustegevuses osalemise. Siiski 
ei ole Riigikohus antud lahendis otseselt eristanud vanu ja uusi võlausaldajaid 
ning lahendi põhjal võib jääda ikkagi selgusetuks, milline võlausaldaja millise 
kahju hüvitamist võib nõuda.  
ÄS § 180 lg 51 üheks eesmärgiks on kaitsta vanade võlausaldajate huve. 
Vanade võlausaldajate huvide kaitse seisneb selles, et kui juhatuse liige esitab 
õigeaegselt pankrotiavalduse, siis läheb kontroll võlgniku majandustegevuse üle 
pankrotihaldurile, kes vastavalt pankrotiseaduse (PankrS) § 55 lg-le 1 on 
kohustatud kaitsma kõigi võlausaldajate, samuti võlgniku õigusi ja huve ning 
tagama seadusliku, kiire ja majanduslikult otstarbeka pankrotimenetluse. Seega 
on ÄS § 180 lg 51 eesmärgiks kaitsta vanu võlausaldajaid võlgniku varamassi 
vähenemise eest. Vastava kohustuse rikkumise korral on vanad võlausaldajad 
õigustatud nõudma juhatuse liikmelt kvoodikahju hüvitamist ulatuses, mille 
võrra ühingu varamass vähenes juhatuse liikme rikkumise tõttu. 
Lisaks eeltoodule läheb PankrS § 35 lg 1 p-de 2 ja 4 kohaselt pankroti 
väljakuulutamisega haldurile üle võlgniku vara valitsemise õigus ning juhatuse 
liige kaotab õiguse teha mis tahes tehinguid. Kui aga juhatuse liige hoidub 
pankrotiavalduse esitamisest ja jätkab maksejõuetu võlgniku majandustegevust 
(s.h sõlmib uusi lepinguid), satuvad uued võlausaldajad keerulisse olukorda, kus 
juba lepingu sõlmimisel on selge, et nende nõuete rahuldamine on vähese 
perspektiiviga, kusjuures hilisemas pankrotimenetluses koheldakse neid teiste 
võlausaldajatega võrdselt. Seetõttu on põhjust väita, et ÄS § 180 lg 51 ees-
märgiks on läbi võlgnikühingu pankroti hoida ära ka tulevaste lepinguliste 
võlasuhete tekkimine ning kaitsta seeläbi uusi võlausaldajaid.  
Saksamaal on võrdlusriikidest kõige põhjalikum kohtupraktika uute võla-
usaldajate usalduskahju kaitse osas. Erinevalt vanadest võlausaldajatest, kelle 
kahjunõude kohtulikuks maksmapanekuks on õigustatud haldur, võivad uued 
võlausaldajad hageda juhatuse liiget otse ning nõuda kogu negatiivse kahju 
hüvitamist (s.o võlausaldaja tuleb asetada olukorda, milles ta oleks olnud, kui ta 
poleks võlgnikühinguga lepingut sõlminud). Uue võlausaldaja positsioon saab 
olla vaid sellistel võlausaldajatel, kelle nõue tuleneb maksejõuetu võlgnikuga 
sõlmitud lepingulisest suhtest. Uue võlausaldaja usalduskahjust pole põhjust 
rääkida nt deliktiliste nõuete korral. 
Inglise õiguses ei eristata uusi ja vanu võlausaldajaid. Kuigi kohus võib 
laialdase diskretsiooni tõttu neid asjaolusid arvesse võtta, mis on uue võla-
usaldaja kahjustamise aluseks, laekub väljamõistetav hüvitis pankrotipessa ning 
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sellest väljamaksete tegemisel pole võimalik uusi ja vanu võlausaldajaid 
eristada. 
Sarnane olukord on ka Hispaanias, s.t juhatuse liikmelt välja mõistetud 
hüvitis laekub pankrotipessa, mistõttu uute ja vanade võlausaldajate eristamine 
on keeruline. Siiski ollakse Hispaanias seisukohal, et teatud tingimustel on uuel 
võlausaldajal võimalik juhatuse liiget hageda ka otse, sõltumata ühingu suhtes 
algatatud pankrotimenetlusest. 
Kokkuvõtvalt võib väita, et vana võlausaldaja on selline võlausaldaja, kelle 
võlasuhe võlgnikuga on tekkinud enne võlgniku püsiva maksejõuetuse tekki-
mist, nõude sissenõutavaks muutumise hetkest sõltumata. Vana võlausaldaja 
kannab tavapärast võlgniku pankrotistumise äririski ning tema puhul usaldus-
kahju hüvitamine ei ole põhjendatud. Isegi kui nõue muutub sissenõutavaks 
alles peale maksejõuetuse tekkimist, ei muuda see vana võlausaldaja positsiooni 
võlgniku suhtes, sest võlasuhte tekkimisel eelduslikult ei osatud võlgniku 
maksejõuetuks muutumist ette näha, mistõttu pole põhjust väita, et võlgniku 
juhatuse liige oleks rikkunud võlausaldaja usaldust. Sama peaks autori arvates 
kehtima ka korduvate kohustuste ja ositi täidetava kohustuse puhul (nt igakuiste 
üüri- või laenumaksete puhul), kui kohustuse aluseks olev võlasuhe on tekkinud 
enne võlgniku maksejõuetuse tekkimist.  
Uue võlausaldaja positsioon ei ole seevastu seotud tavapärase äririski kand-
misega, vaid tema puhul saab algusest peale rääkida usalduse kuritarvitamisest. 
Autor leiab, et usalduskahju hüvitamist saab nõuda vaid selline võlausaldaja, 
kelle nõue on tekkinud lepingulisest suhtest. Nt deliktiliste nõuete puhul ei saa 
rääkida usaldusest, mida juhatuse liige oleks rikkunud. Samal põhjusel ei toeta 
autor selliste uute võlausaldajate usalduskahju hüvitamist, kes olid ühingu 
maksejõuetusest lepingu sõlmimisel teadlikud, sest nende usaldust pole tegeli-
kult rikutud. Kui võlausaldaja ei saa oma nõuet usalduskahjuna maksma panna, 
jääb tal võimalus esitada see kvoodikahju nõudena.  
Uute võlausaldajate selge eristamine ning nende usalduskahju nõuete 
tunnustamine (ja juhatuse liikme vastu otsenõude esitamise võimaldamine) 
aitab paremini kaitsta uute võlausaldajate huve, sest nende nõuete esitamine 
juhatuse liikme vastu on märksa lihtsam võrreldes vana võlausaldaja kvoodi-
kahju nõuete esitamisega (puudub vajadus tõendada kvoodikahju). Autor leiab, 
et juhatuse liikme rangem vastutus antud küsimuses ei pärsi tema ette-
võtlusvaimu, sest pankrotiavalduse esitamine on selgelt juhatuse liikme enda 
mõjusfääris ning selle kohustuse rikkumine ei saa olla juhatuse liikmele 
ootamatu. Pealegi ei ole tõenäoline, et maksejõuetute ühingute majandus-
tegevuse jätkamise julgustamine omaks ettevõtluse ja majanduse arengu seisu-
kohast positiivset efekti. 
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III Ühingu alakapitaliseerituse olukorras tegevusetuks jäänud 
juhatuse liikme kohustus hüvitada võlausaldajatele tekitatud kahju 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Ainuüksi alakapitaliseeritud ühingu üldkoosoleku kokkukutsumise nõude rikku-
mine ei too enesega kaasa juhatuse liikme deliktilist vastutust võlausaldajate 
ees. Juhatuse liikme deliktilise vastutuse tekkimise eeldusena antud olukorras 
peaks tal olema lisaks veel kohustus ühingu likvideerimiseks, kui üldkoosolek 
pole seaduses sätestatud tähtaja jooksul aset leidnud või kui üldkoosolek on 
võtnud vastu otsuse, mis ei ole ühingu alakapitaliseerituse ületamiseks piisav 
või kui üldkoosolek on võtnud vastu otsuse ühingu likvideerimiseks.  
 
Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
ÄS § 171 lg 2 p 1 kohaselt kutsub juhatus kokku üldkoosoleku, kui osaühingul 
on netovara järel vähem kui pool osakapitalist või vähem kui äriseadustiku §-s 
136 nimetatud osakapitali suurus või muu seaduses sätestatud osakapitali 
minimaalne suurus (alakapitaliseeritus). Üldkoosolek võtab omakorda vastavalt 
ÄS § 176 vastu otsuse ühingu kapitali suuruse muutmiseks, ühingu likvideeri-
miseks, ümberkujundamiseks, lõpetamiseks, pankroti väljakuulutamiseks vm 
abinõude tarvitusele võtmiseks. Kui üldkoosolek mingit otsust vastu ei võta või 
kui vastu võetud otsus pole alakapitaliseerituse ületamiseks adekvaatne, ei 
järgne Eestis juhatuse liikmele alakapitaliseerituse olukorras rohkem mingeid 
kohustusi ega vastutust. Alles siis, kui alakapitaliseeritus on kasvanud üle ühin-
gu püsivaks maksejõuetuseks, on juhatuse liikmel ÄS § 180 lg 51 alusel 
kohustus esitada 20 päeva jooksul kohtule pankrotiavaldus. 
Autor on väitekirjas analüüsinud võimalust esitada juhatuse liikme vastu 
kahjunõue, kui ta jääb alakapitaliseerituse olukorras tegevusetuks. Kui võla-
usaldajad saaks oma rahuldamata jäänud nõuded kasvõi osaliselt esitada oma 
kohustusi rikkunud juhatuse liikme vastu, kaitseks see suuremal määral 
võlausaldajate õigusi ja soodustaks ühingu likvideerimis- või pankrotimenetluse 
alustamist varasemas staadiumis, kui ühingul on veel säilinud vara, mille arvel 
võlausaldajate nõudeid rahuldada. 
Autori arvates ei ole ÄS § 171 lg 2 p 1 võlausaldajaid otseselt kaitsvaks 
kaitsenormiks. Nimetatud sättest tuleneb üksnes juhatuse liikme kohustus 
üldkoosoleku kokkukutsumiseks, millise kohustuse täitmine ei anna iseenesest 
mingit garantiid, et üldkoosolek võtaks vastu otsuse ühingu alakapitaliseerituse 
ületamiseks. Juhul kui üldkoosolek otsustab ühingu kapitali parandamiseks 
midagi ette võtta, siis see võib vaid kaudselt kaitsta võlausaldajate huve. Kui 
aga üldkoosolek otsustab mitte midagi ette võtta, on juhatus formaalselt oma 
kohustused täitnud, kuid võlausaldajate huvid on jäänud täiesti kaitseta.  
Saksa ja Inglise õiguses piirdub alakapitaliseeritud ühingu juhatuse liikme 
kohustus samuti vaid üldkoosoleku kokkukutsumisega (vastavalt GmbHG § 49 
lg 3 ja Companies Act 2006 art 656), mistõttu ka nendes riikides pole võla-
usaldajatel võimalik juhatuse liikme vastu kahjunõudeid esitada, kui ta jääb 
ühingu alakapitaliseerituse olukorras tegevusetuks. 
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Seevastu Hispaania õiguses võib alakapitaliseeritud ühingu juhatuse liikme 
kohustuste rikkumisega kaasneda tema isiklik vastutus võlausaldajate nõuete 
eest (TRLSC § 367). Peamine erinevus teiste võrdlusriikidega seisneb selles, et 
Hispaanias on juhatuse liikmel alakapitaliseerituse ilmnemisel lisaks üldkoos-
oleku kokkukutsumise kohustusele veel seadusest tulenev kohustus ühingu 
lõpetamiseks, kui üldkoosolek ei leia seaduses sätestatud tähtaja jooksul aset või 
kui üldkoosolekul vastu võetud otsused pole alakapitaliseerituse ületamiseks 
piisavad.  
Autor on seisukohal, et Eesti, Saksa ja Inglise õiguses sätestatud juhatuse 
liikme kohustus alakapitaliseeritud ühingu üldkoosoleku kokkukutsumiseks 
kaitseb võlausaldajate huve vaid kaudselt – eeldusel, et osanikud/aktsionärid 
otsustavad ühingu kapitali aktiivselt panustada või võtavad tarvitusele muud 
adekvaatsed meetmed. Kui osanikud/aktsionärid jäävad tegevusetuks, ei oma 
juhatuse liikme üldkoosoleku kokkukutsumise kohustuse täitmine/mitte 
täitmine ühingu kapitali ega võlausaldajate kaitse seisukohast mingit tähendust. 
Seetõttu on autori arvates põhjendatud Hispaania õiguse eeskujul alakapitali-
seeritud ühingu juhatuse liikmele täiendava kohustuste sätestamine, mille koha-
selt ta peab asuma ühingut likvideerima, kui üldkoosolek pole seaduses sätes-
tatud tähtaja jooksul aset leidnud või kui üldkoosolek on võtnud vastu otsuse, 
mis ei ole ühingu alakapitaliseerituse ületamiseks piisav või kui üldkoosolek on 
võtnud vastu otsuse ühingu likvideerimiseks. Eesti õiguse näitel võiks kirjel-
datud lisakohustus olla käsitletav kaitsenormina VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 7 tähen-
duses, mille kaitse eesmärk oleks suunatud sarnaselt ÄS § 180 lg-ga 51 ühingu 
majandustegevuse lõpetamisele ja kapitali edasise vähenemise ärahoidmisele, 
selle erisusega, et juhatuse liikme vastutuse algusmoment nihkuks püsiva 
maksejõuetuse tekkimise hetkest ettepoole ühingu alakapitaliseerituse aega.  
Juhatuse liikme seisukohast ei oleks selline rangem vastutus ootamatu. 
Juhatuse liikmel on niikuinii ühingu aruandluse pidamise kohustus ning ühingu 
alakapitaliseeritus ei saa tulla juhatuse liikme jaoks üllatusena. Alakapitali-
seerituse ilmnemisel on juhatuse liikmel piisavalt aega ühingu saneerimis-
võimaluste igakülgseks läbikaalumiseks ja selle otsustamiseks, kas ühingu 
netokapitali seaduse nõuetega vastavusse viimine on perspektiivne. 
 
 
IV Vastutus tahtlikul valeinfo esitamisel 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Juhatuse liige ei vastuta igasuguse tahtliku valeinfo esitamise korral. Juhatuse 
liikme deliktilise vastutuse eeldusena peab avaldatud valeinfo omama kahjus-
tatud poole tehingu tegemise otsustuse seisukohast määravat tähendust ning 
kahjustatud pool peab olema vastavale infole ka tuginenud. Juhatuse liikme 
vastutus tahtliku valeinfo avaldamise korral võib kaasneda nii aktiivse ja kui 
passiivse tegevusega. 
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Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 8 kohaselt on kahju tekitamine õigusvastane, kui see on 
tekitatud tahtliku heade kommete vastase käitumisega. Tegu on universaalse 
normiga, mis rakendub kõikides olukordades, kui isik on käitunud tahtlikult ja 
heade kommete vastaselt.  
Autor asus seisukohale, et tahtlik valeinfo esitamine võib olla käsitletav 
heade kommete vastase käitumisena, kuid juhatuse liige ei vastuta VÕS § 1045 
lg 1 p 8 alusel siiski igasuguse valeandmete esitamise korral. Juhatuse liikme 
deliktilise vastutuse eelduseks valeandmete esitamisel on see, et esitatud infol 
on otsustav tähendus kahjustatud poole tehinguotsuse langetamisel ning 
kahjustatud pool on sellele infole ka tuginenud.  
Kuigi võrdlusriikides on õigusdogmaatiline lähenemine antud küsimusele 
erinev, jõutakse kõigis riikides valeinfo tahtliku avaldamise korral sarnaste 
vastutuse eeldusteni. Küll on mõnevõrra erinev lähenemine küsimuses, kas 
lisaks aktiivsele valeinfo avaldamisele võib ka passiivne valeinfo avaldamine 
(s.o tõese info varjamine) olla juhatuse liikme vastutuse aluseks (nt Inglise 
õiguses on kahjunõude esitamise võimalused piiratud, kui juhatuse liikme 
rikkumine seisneb tõese info varjamises; seevastu Saksa kohtupraktikas on 
juhatuse liikme vastutust olulise info tahtliku varjamise eest jaatatud).  
Kuigi eetiliselt on igasuguse valetamine lubamatu, ei saa juhatuse liikme 
deliktiline vastutus võlausaldajate ees kaasneda siiski igasuguse asjaolude 
ilustamise või liialduste korral. Vastutuse aluseks olev valeinfo peab olema 
kahjustatud isiku tehinguotsustuse seisukohast määrav ning loomulikult peab 
kahjustatud isik olema sellele ka tuginenud. Vastutuse aluseks olev valeandmete 
esitamine võib autori arvates seisneda nii aktiivses info väljastamises kui ka 
kannatanud poole jaoks äratuntavalt olulise info varjamises. Kannatanu jaoks 
olulise info tahtlik varjamine ei ole kuidagi kergem rikkumine, kui valeinfo 
aktiivne esitamine.  
Autori arvates on juhatuse liikme deliktiline vastutus eelkirjeldatud eelduste 
esinemisel põhjendatud. Juhatuse liikme tahtluse tõendamine asetab võla-
usaldajale kõrge tõendamiskoormise, mis hoiab juhatuse liikme vastutuse 
mõistlikes piirides ja väldib nõuete laviini vallandumist igasugu hooletu info 
kontrollimise-esitamise korral juhatuse liikme poolt. Pealegi saab juhatuse liige 
isikliku vastutuse tekkimist lihtsalt vältida, kui ta hoidub tahtlikust valetamisest. 
 
 
V Vastutus valeinfo hooletul esitamisel (culpa in contrahendo) 
Kaitsmisele kuuluv väide: 
Juhatuse liikme kui ühingu seadusliku esindaja isiklik vastutus valeinfo hooletul 
esitamisel võib tõusetuda erilise usaldussuhte olemasolul juhatuse liikme ja 
tehingu teise poole vahel. Pelgalt juhatuse liikme isiklik majandushuvi ühingus 
ei tohiks valeinfo hooletu avaldamise korral olla tema vastutuse eelduseks. 
Üksnes juhul, kui tehing on küll formaalselt sõlmitud ühingu nimel, kuid selle 
tehingu majanduslik sisu teenib ainult juhatuse liikme erahuvi, võib juhatuse 
liikme majandushuvi olla aluseks tema isiklikule vastutusele. 
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Probleemi kirjeldus ja põhjendused: 
Erandlikel juhtudel võib juhatuse liikme isiklik vastutus ka valeinfo hooletul 
esitamisel kõne alla tulla. VÕS § 14 sätestab nõude pidada lepingueelseid läbi-
rääkimisi heas usus (culpa in contrahendo – c.i.c). Muuhulgas peavad lepingu-
eelsete läbirääkimiste käigus teise poolele esitatavad andmed olema tõesed ning 
pool peab teatama teisele poolele kõigist asjaoludest, mille vastu teisel poolel 
on lepingu eesmärki arvestades äratuntav oluline huvi. 
Kuigi VÕS §-s 14 sätestatud kohustused laienevad eelkõige läbirääkimiste 
poolele, ei välista nimetatud säte ka poole esindaja (juhatuse liikme) isiklikku 
vastutust c.i.c alusel. Juhatuse liikme kui äriühingu esindaja vastutus vale-
andmete esitamisega võlausaldajale tekitatud kahju eest c.i.c alusel on võimalik 
eelkõige juhul, kui kannatanu ja juhatuse liikme vahel on tekkinud eriline 
usaldussuhe, mis on lubanud kannatanul põhjendatult uskuda, et juhatuse liige 
on võtnud isikliku vastutuse esitatud andmete õigsuse eest.  
Pelgalt juhatuse liikme isiklik majandushuvi äriühingus ei ole autori arvates 
aluseks tema vastutusele c.i.c alusel. Sõltuvalt asjaoludest võib siiski juhatuse 
liikme vastutust c.i.c alusel teatud juhtudel jaatada, kui tehing on sõlmitud 
formaalselt küll ühingu nimel, kuid majanduslikus mõttes puudutab konkreetne 
tehing üksnes juhatuse liikme erasfääri (tegutsemine procurator in rem suam 
põhimõttel). 
Teistes võrdlusriikides tunnustatakse c.i.c põhimõtet Saksa õiguses (BGB § 
280 ja § 311 lg 3) ning teatud määral ka Hispaanias (kuigi Hispaania 
tsiviilkoodeksis vastav regulatsioon puudub, on kohtupraktikas tuletatud c.i.c 
põhimõte deliktiõiguse üldregulatsioonist). Mõlemas riigis peetakse juhatuse 
liikme kui ühingu esindaja vastutust valeinfo esitamisel c.i.c alusel piiratud 
ulatuses võimalikuks.  
Inglise õiguses c.i.c põhimõtet otseselt ei tunta, kuid nõude eelduste osas on 
sellele küllalt lähedane negligent misrepresentation kui eraldiseisev delikt, mis 
võimaldab erandlikel asjaoludel juhatuse liikme vastu kahjunõude esitamist. 
Juhatuse liige võib viidatud delikti alusel vastutada, kui ta on võtnud endale 
sisuliselt garandi rolli, tekitades tehingu teises pooles põhjendatud usalduse, et 
ta vastutab koos ühinguga avaldatud info õigsuse eest. 
Autor on asunud kokkuvõtvalt seisukohale, et juhatuse liikme vastutus 
valeinfo hooletu avaldamise korral ei saa kindlasti olla võrdväärne poole 
(äriühingu) enda vastutusega, sest vastasel juhul muutuks juhatuse liikme 
vastutus ebamõistlikult rangeks, kui ta vastutaks igal hooletul valeinfo esitamise 
juhtumil solidaarselt ühinguga.  
Juhatuse liige võib vastutada valeandmete hooletul esitamisel eelkõige juhul, 
kui tema ja tehingu teise poole vahel on tekkinud eriline usaldussuhe. Selle 
täpsem sisustamine on igal üksikjuhtumil kohtu otsustada, kuid peamise 
kriteeriumina on põhjust välja tuua, et eriline usaldussuhe ei saa mingil juhul 
võrduda tavapäraselt käibes rakendatava usaldusega. Erilisest usaldusest on 
põhjust rääkida, kui poolel on tekkinud juhatuse liikme suhtes põhjendatult 
oluliselt kõrgem usaldus, kui tal on teiste isikute suhtes samalaadsete tehingute 
sõlmimisel.  
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Isiklik majandushuvi ei tohiks autori arvates üldjuhul olla juhatuse liikme 
vastutuse aluseks valeinfo hooletu esitamise korral. Nt pelgalt ühingu osanikuks 
olek ei tohiks tekitada juhatuse liikmele vastutust kõnesoleval alusel. See oleks 
vastuolus ühingu piiratud vastutuse põhimõttega, sest sisuliselt tekitaks osani-
kuks oleku fakt juhatuse liikmele täiendava vastutuse ühingu kohustuste eest, 
samas kui osaniku vastutus on piiratud tema kapitaliosalusega ühingus. Ka muu 
lepinguline huvi ei tohiks iseenesest mõjutada juhatuse liikme vastutust, sest 
nõnda on oht jõuda tulemuseni, et juhatuse liikme isiklik vastutus võrdsustub 
äriühingu vastutusega. Autor peab võimalikuks juhatuse liikme vastutust vale-
info hooletul esitamisel üksnes erandlikel juhtudel, kui juhatuse liige on teinud 
tehingu küll ühingu nimel, kuid majanduslikus mõttes puudutab see tehing 
üksnes juhatuse liikme enda erahuvi (procurator in rem suam). Lisatingimusena 
peaks ka tehingu teine pool aru saama, et tehing puudutab juhatuse liikme 
erahuvi. Kui tehingu teine pool ei tea juhatuse liikme isiklikust huvist midagi, 
pole tal ka põhjust tehingu sõlmimisel eeldada, et lisaks ühingule vastutab 
tehingu täitmise eest veel keegi.  
Juhatuse liikme isikliku vastutuse jaatamine valeinfo hooletu avaldamise 
korral ei laienda autori arvates ebamõislikult juhatuse liikme vastutuse piire, 
sest need juhtumid, kui juhatuse liikme vastutus kõnesoleval alusel saab üldse 
rakenduda, on väga erandlikud. Kuigi juhatuse liikme vastutus valeinfo hooletul 
avaldamisel võib olla võlausaldajate kaitse seisukohast marginaalse tähen-
dusega, on selle vastutuse tunnustamine autori arvates siiski oluline, sest või-
maldab kaitsta võlausaldajaid erilise usalduse kuritarvitamise eest. 
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